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          Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or 
have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. 
Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs 
following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-
radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist 
extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country’s efforts have emphasized 
different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success.  
          This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that 
may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist 
terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that 
may be conducive to success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects that 
country’s level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. 
Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state’s official 
religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious re-
education or on social re-integration.   
          The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de-
radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, 
revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country’s level of state 
repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although 
there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the 
percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country’s de-
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radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are 
less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries 
with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the 
state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, 
all 3 relationships are not strong.  
          Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists—as a 
practice and concept—is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers 
considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own 
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          Introduction 
 
  “Releasing prisoners without a comprehensive rehabilitation programme ‘is like 
releasing 30,000 political bombs.’”1 
 
          Countries pursue de-radicalization programs to combat Islamist extremism and 
Islamist terrorism. With the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), countries around the world, including the 
United Kingdom (UK), have entertained de-radicalization schemes aimed at Islamist 
extremists returning from Iraq and Syria.2 Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway currently run or have run such programs.  
          Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Denmark, and various other 
countries initiated de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist 
terrorists after the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, as this event 
brought the reality of Islamist terrorism to the forefront of every country’s collective 
conscience.3 Although Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism have existed since 
before September 11th, de-radicalization has become increasingly relevant as foreign 
fighters return home equipped with the know-how to carry out terrorist attacks in their 
own backyard.  
1 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Group Deradicalization in Egypt: The Unfinished Agenda,” in 
Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programmes and Their 
Impact in Muslim Majority States, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 98. 
2 Tom Whitehead, The Telegraph, “British jihadists to be forced to attend deradicalisation programmes, 
says Cameron,” (published September 1, 2014) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/11068878/British-jihadists-to-be-forced-to-attend-deradicalisation-programmes-says-Cameron.html 
(accessed March 18, 2015). The article describes some programs that the UK already has to de-radicalize 
Islamist extremists, including Al Furqan, where imams attempt to moderate the beliefs of Islamist extremist 
prisoners “through religious teaching.”  
3 Adam Lankford and Katherine Gillespie, “Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter-Indoctrination: 
Lessons Learned from the Saudi Arabian Program,” International Criminal Justice Review 21 (2011): 119. 
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          To evaluate de-radicalization programs in different countries, the paper first 
explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to 
success, such as a state’s developmental capacity, the strength of its political institutions, 
and a state’s ability to build national consensus around its de-radicalization efforts, have 
contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim-majority countries. I hypothesize 
that countries with more successful de-radicalization programs will experience fewer 
Islamist terrorist attacks. The dependent variable is the number of Islamist terrorist 
attacks in each country, and the independent variable is each country’s degree of success 
with de-radicalization. The study reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de-
radicalization efforts increases, the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country 
increases significantly. 
          The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to 
success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects Muslim-majority countries’ 
success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. I hypothesize that 
more repressive states will have more successful de-radicalization programs. The 
dependent variable is the success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts, and the 
independent variable is each country’s level of state repression. As state repression 
increases, the success of de-radicalization programs increases, although not significantly.  
          Thirdly, I examine the effect of religious characteristics on what de-radicalization 
approaches various Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries pursue. I 
explore whether the percentage of the country’s population that is Muslim; a state’s 
official religion; and constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree 
with the religious interpretation that the state endorses affect whether states focus their 
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de-radicalization efforts more on religious re-education or on social re-integration. I 
hypothesize that countries with greater Muslim populations; countries with official 
religions; and countries that place greater constraints on adherents of the majority religion 
who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses are more likely 
to focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists on 
religious re-education. I find that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total 
population a country has the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts focus on religious 
re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-
radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on 
adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious 
interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. All 3 relationships, 
however, are not significant. 
           
         Islamism, Islamist Extremism, and Jihad 
         This paper engages the concepts of Islamism, Islamist extremism, and jihad. 
Islamism is a radical ideology that seeks a return to Islam the way it was practiced by its 
ancient forefathers, with strict adherence to Muslim Shari’a law and the Qu’ran.4 
Islamism encompasses several movements, including Salafism, Wahhabism, and national 
movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).5 Salafism calls for the establishment 
of an Islamic state, the expulsion of non-Muslims from Muslim lands, and the 
renunciation by Muslims of Western influences. The global Salafist movement 
4 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
2. 
5 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: the Search for a new Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004), 69-70.  
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encompasses groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Al Qaeda, and ISIS.6 
Wahhabism follows strict adherence to Shari’a law, and is practiced today in Saudi 
Arabia with laws denouncing teachings in Saudi schoolbooks that are in conflict with 
Wahhabist dictates.7 For groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, the EIJ and others, Islamism is 
their raison d-être. 
          Regarding Salafism, Cordesman (2006) believes that the West’s most critical 
terrorism threat stems from “neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism” specifically: “The 
struggle is religious and ideological, not military or driven by secular values. It is a 
struggle for the future of Islam, and it is not generic, global or focused on political or 
economic systems.”8 Al Qaeda, and now ISIS promote themselves as being Sunni, and 
Osama bin Laden has publicly ridiculed Shia Muslims by referring to Shia heads as 
“traitors.”9 
         Integral to the understanding of Islamism is jihad, which many Islamists use to 
legitimate violence against non-believers or “infidels.”10 There is a distinction between 
two forms of jihad: the “greater jihad,” which involves the individual, non-violent 
struggle to live a righteous Muslim life, and the “lesser jihad,” which involves fighting an 
external enemy of Islam, often involving physical combat.11 Although mainstream 
6 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 171. The EIJ is also known as the Islamic Jihad (IJ) or 
al-Jihad. See Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements, 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 55. 
7 Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accomodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of 
Wahhabism,” New York University Law Review 79 (2004): 488-490.   
8 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism’: A Fundamentally Different Strategy,” Middle 
East Policy XIII (Fall 2006): 101. 
9 BBC News, “‘Bin Laden’ warning to Iraq Shias,” (published July 2, 2006) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5137302.stm (accessed March 18, 2015). 
10 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 2. 
11 Michael David Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 13. 
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Muslims commonly accept the greater-lesser jihad concept, violent Islamist extremists 
only associate jihad with the pursuit of violent action. The Egyptian Islamic Group (IG), 
for example, equated jihad with violence, as the group believed that negotiation and other 
softer measures would not accomplish the ultimate goal of instituting an Islamic 
caliphate.12     
 
          Radicalization, Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization, and Disengagement 
          Radicalization can be conceptualized as an ideological process or transformation 
that individuals or groups experience: “radicalization is the development of beliefs, 
feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict.”13 It does not 
necessarily amount to violence, but, as in the case of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, 
may lead to violent behavior. In conceptualizing efforts to combat radicalization, 
Brandon and Vidino (2012) see counter-radicalization as a “sort of catch-all term that 
includes three types of initiatives, each with a specific objective: de-radicalization, 
disengagement, and radicalization prevention.”14 In contrast, the “United Nations 
Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism” views counter-
12 Diaa Rashwan, “The renunciation of violence by Egyptian jihadi organizations,” in Leaving Terrorism 
Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (London: Routledge, 
2009), 119. 
13 Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 
14 James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in Europe,” International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (2012): 9. See also Hamed El-Said, “Introduction: 
Definitions and Conceptual Framework,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization 
and De-Radicalization Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States, ed. Hamed El-Said and 
Jane Harrigan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 6.  
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radicalization along the lines of preventing radicalization, while de-radicalization is about 
social re-integration, or convincing terrorists to abandon violence.15      
          Whereas de-radicalization may entail a change in thinking, disengagement refers to 
terrorists changing their behavior, or “getting individuals and groups involved in 
terrorism to give up their participation in such activities – often referred to as 
disengagement, desistance or exit processes.”16 Specifically, “physical disengagement” 
can involve “apprehension by the security services, perhaps with subsequent 
imprisonment;” “forced movement into another role as a result of disobeying orders;” or 
‘decapitation,’ when a country’s security services target terrorist leaders for execution.17    
         Although Braddock and Horgan (2010) recognize that de-radicalization “implies 
change at the cognitive level” and disengagement is behavioral, de-radicalization 
programs may address problems associated with detainees returning to terrorism: ‘[De-
radicalization is] the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s 
commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that 
they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-
radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-
offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.’18 To 
15 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalisation,” PPN 
Working Paper (June 2010): 1. 
16 Tore Bjørgo, Strategies for Preventing Terrorism, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 87. Bjørgo 
identifies disengagement as a terrorism prevention strategy. Regarding disengagement, Bjørgo describes 
the preventive mechanism as making individual or group terrorist campaigns cease to exist, so that 
terrorism cannot continue.  
17 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, (London: Routledge, 2014), 139-141. Horgan distinguishes 
physical disengagement from psychological disengagement, which is essentially de-radicalization. See 
Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security 
Studies 18 (October-December 2009): 719-755. 
18 Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010): 280. 
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prevent recidivism, for instance, countries’ security services may monitor released 
individuals to help ensure that they do not take up terrorism again.   
          While Dechesne (2011)19 claims that disengagement is tactical and de-
radicalization is “strategic,” with de-radicalization making dialogue possible, Ashour 
(2009) argues that de-radicalization can be tactical and strategic.20 Acknowledging that 
de-radicalization is about an extremist or terrorist group disavowing its radical ideas, he 
nevertheless claims that de-radicalization can simply be behavioral, without any 
accompanying rejection of radical ideology.21 De-radicalization is “comprehensive” 
when a terrorist group successfully de-radicalizes at the behavioral, ideological, and 
“organizational” level, where the “armed units of the organization” peacefully disband.22 
The IG’s de-radicalization process was comprehensive, as the group disarmed with the 
full backing of the IG’s leadership.23 
         De-radicalization does not always follow from disengagement, as some individuals 
pursue terrorism without first developing a radical ideology: “Individuals do not always 
join extremist groups on ideological grounds; many acquire extremist views after they 
join. And some lose their ideological views as a consequence of leaving the group, rather 
than leaving the group because they have lost faith in the ideology.”24 An individual may 
choose to join a terrorist group because of the promise of financial compensation by the 
19 Mark Dechesne, “Deradicalization: Not Soft, but Strategic,” Crime, Law and Social Change 55 (2011): 
287. 
20 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements, 5-6. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, 6. The author also argues that de-radicalization can be substantive, where de-radicalization takes 
place successfully in terms of changing behavior and ideology, but not organizationally. Additionally, de-
radicalization can be pragmatic, where de-radicalization occurs successfully at the behavioral and 
organizational levels, but lacks an ideological component.  
23 Ibid, 51. 




                                                 
group’s leadership or because a family member convinces them to join, for example, as 
opposed to joining because the ideology is appealing.  
         Similarly, terrorists may wish to abandon violence but are unable to do so, as “a 
person can remain deeply disillusioned and even have profound remorse for his or her 
activity, but remain ‘stuck’ in the terrorist group because of an absence of available 
opportunities for disengagement. A terrorist can thus be de-radicalized but not necessarily 
disengaged.”25 Today, ISIS threatens the lives of British jihadis wishing to abandon 
terrorism and come back to Britain.26 ISIS expects foreign fighters to declare their loyalty 
to the group, so that if an individual defies the Islamic State by refusing to execute a 
martyrdom operation, ISIS can penalize the individual by killing them.27 Although these 
British jihadis may be disillusioned by ISIS’ radical agenda, they may be forced to 
continue terrorist operations against their will. 
          
         Involuntary Versus Voluntary Disengagement 
         Regarding disengagement, terrorists can abandon violence either voluntarily or 
involuntarily: “Involuntary disengagement might result from the death or imprisonment 
of a terrorist or by his or her expulsion from the terrorist group. Voluntary 
disengagement, on the other hand, entails that an individual out of his or her own volition 
has turned away from terrorism.”28 One terrorist who voluntary disengaged is Morten 
Storm, a Danish convert to Islam who abandoned violent Islamist extremism in 2006 out 
25 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 140. 
26 Mark Townsend, The Guardian, “Isis threatens to kill British jihadis wanting to come home” 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/25/isis-threatens-kill-british-jihadis-wanting-to-come-home 
(published October 25, 2014) (accessed November 8, 2014). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 36 (2013): 101. 
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of anger at the idea of killing innocent civilians simply because they did not share the 
same fundamentalist views.29 Storm was an Al Qaeda mole, helping Danish 
counterterrorism efforts and assisting the Central Intelligence Agency capture the 
American Al Qaeda spokesman Anwar al-Awlaki.30   
         Involuntary disengagement, on the other hand, may occur when an “individual’s 
[terrorist] organization decides it is going to call a cease-fire, or when an individual 
member is apprehended and incarcerated.”31 Additionally, terrorists may be encouraged 
to disengage from terrorism “if a government offers them amnesty or reduced prison 
sentences,” or if a government ensures “employment and financial support” for 
abandoning violence.32  
           
         Collective Versus Individual Disengagement and De-Radicalization 
         Collective disengagement or de-radicalization occurs when most or all members of 
a terrorist group abandon violence, or the underlying extremist ideology.33 These 
processes require strong leadership to encourage group members to reform, as well as a 
hierarchical structure, as it is more difficult to hold sway over a decentralized network.34 
Egypt’s IG collectively de-radicalized between 1997 and 2002 as a result of state 
repression and religious re-learning, where the government supplied incarcerated group 
29 Morten Storm, TIME, “ISIS Wants Me Dead: Why You May Be Next,” http://time.com/author/morten-
storm/#author/morten-storm/ (published September 5, 2014), (accessed October 18, 2014). 
30 Ibid. 
31 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 140. 
32 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2010), 16-17. 
33 Peter R. Neumann, “Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries,” 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) in partnership with the 




                                                 
members with “books and other religious texts and gave them free access to materials 
that allowed them to expand their religious knowledge.”35 Through exposure to new 
religious texts, IG members realized that violent historical mobilizations against non-
Muslims—including Ibn Taymiyya’s “calls to mobilize” against Tartars trying to bring 
down “the Islamic state”—were not relevant to contemporary society.36  
         In Singapore, by contrast, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainees are treated individually 
during de-radicalization: “JI detainees were never jointly counselled and they were kept 
apart from one another in detention.”37 In 2002, believing that detainees’ spouses were 
influenced by the extremist ideology perpetuated by their husbands, the Singapore 
Government began offering “financial assistance” to detainees’ family members, in the 
form of funding for their children’s education, and job coaching and financial literacy 
instruction for detainees’ spouses.38 Such inducements are not commonly found in 
collective de-radicalization, since the focus is not on individuals and their families. 
 
          Characterizing De-radicalization and Related Terms for This Paper 
          For the purposes of this paper, I apply the characterizations of counter-
radicalization and de-radicalization that El-Said (2012) uses, with counter-radicalization 
being about “preventing further radicalisation,” and de-radicalization having more to do 
35 Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin, “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting 
Militant Islam in Egypt,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (2008): 468-470.  
36 Ibid, 469. The Egyptian Government also supplied religious texts to the terrorist group Islamic Jihad, 
whose members de-radicalized in 2007. 
37 Kumar Ramakrishna, “The ‘Three Rings’ of Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Ideological Work in 
Singapore a Decade on,” in Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, 
Radicalisation and Reform, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2014), 430. 
38 Ibid, 433-434. 
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with “rehabilitating and counselling those who have already become radicalised.”39 
Moreover, I apply his idea of disengagement as falling within the realm of de-
radicalization: “The process [of de-radicalization] can include a cognitive change (change 
in ideology and attitudes), simple disengagement (behavioral change to abandon violence 
while remaining radical), or both.”40 Additionally, I concur with El-Said (2015) that de-
radicalization can entail any one individual or combination of various elements, namely 
“religious rehabilitation, education, vocational training, social training, family programs, 
physical programs and post-care or release programs,” all of which “facilitate the 
reintegration of released detainees” into society.41  
          Furthermore, I distinguish Islamist extremists from Islamist terrorists, as not all 
extremists employ terrorist tactics. Consequently, some de-radicalization programs may 
center on extremists who do not practice violence. Saudi Arabia, for example, gears its 
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC) program toward “radicalized 
individuals who have not yet taken violent action and attempts to reintegrate them into 
Saudi society.”42 However, in some instances throughout the paper, I use the term violent 
Islamist extremists to refer to Islamist extremists who have employed terrorism.  
          Another point of clarification is that although I may refer to the whole of a 
country’s de-radicalization efforts aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists as a 
39 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 
International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Developments in Radicalisation 
and Political Violence (January 2012): 1-2. 
40 Hamed El-Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter 
Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 10. 
41 Ibid. 
42 J. Scott Carpenter, Michael Jacobson, and Matthew Levitt, “Confronting the Ideology of Radical 
Extremism,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 3 (2009): 315. Although Saudi Arabia may target 
individuals for de-radicalization simply based on their extremist beliefs, the country has also de-radicalized 
former terrorists, including individuals affiliated with AQAP.   
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de-radicalization program, some countries may have multiple de-radicalization programs. 
For instance, Malaysia’s Kamunting program is reserved for those Islamist extremists or 
Islamist terrorists who may pose less of a threat to the state with regard to “intention and 
capabilities,” while the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) place a smaller number of “hard-
core detainees” in a more intensive program.43 Still, I bundle these initiatives together to 
avoid confusion when describing a country’s de-radicalization efforts.   
          Notwithstanding the diversity among different states’ de-radicalization programs, it 
is worthwhile to study them together to draw conclusions about why some programs have 
been more successful than others, as well as to examine why states have selected the mix 
























43 Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” in Deradicalizing 
Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim 
majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 148-149.  
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Chapter 1. A Recipe for Success? Examining Whether Political Stability, 
Developmental Strength, Civil Society Participation, and Other Factors That may 
Favor Successful De-radicalization Lead to Less Islamist Terrorism 
 
        This chapter uses a cross-country comparison to determine how certain factors that 
may favor successful de-radicalization, including political stability; developmental 
strength; civil society involvement; new government leadership; countrywide support for 
de-radicalization; significant involvement of religious authorities; unilateral abandonment 
of Islamist extremism or terrorism; and a lack of Western influence will affect the 
number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim-majority countries.44 I posit that states 
exhibiting features favorable to successful de-radicalization will experience fewer 
Islamist terrorist attacks. A new state leadership that coincides with the initiation of de-
radicalization efforts, for example, may make such efforts more effective by pursuing 
Islamist terrorists and Islamist extremists more aggressively.45 Consequently, I expect 
that such states will be more effective at reducing Islamist terrorism. 
          My study uses information from case studies of de-radicalization programs in 
Muslim-majority countries, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.46 Using data analysis, I measure the total number of Islamist 
terrorist attacks for each country during the core years in which each country’s de-
radicalization programs take place, against a numeric ranking of each country’s 
44 While both the de-radicalization of the IG and IJ in Egypt was started by IG and IJ members themselves, 
the Egyptian Government did facilitate prison-based conversations between IG and IJ heads, their 
followers, as well as other “secular and political prisoners.” See Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising 
Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 18. 
45 Ibid, 13-14.  
46 Ibid, 6. I do not include one of the countries that the author uses, Morocco, as its de-radicalization efforts 
are very new. De-radicalization took off in the wake of the Arab Spring in April 2011, when the Moroccan 
King “pardon[ed] or reduce[d] the sentences of 190, mainly Salafi jhadist, prisoners.” See Souad 
Mekhennet, New York Times, “Morrocan King Opens Door for Change,” (published April 27, 2011) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/africa/28iht-morocco28.html?_r=0 (accessed March 27, 2015). 
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success.47 The results show that de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the 
factors that may be favorable to successful de-radicalization will produce more Islamist 
terrorist attacks. In my analysis, I explore whether other explanations, such as 
International Organization (IO) membership, religious freedom, and regime type may 
help to understand why states experience more or less Islamist terrorism. 
          
          Evaluating the Success of De-radicalization Programs Targeted at Islamist  
          Extremists and Islamist Terrorists 
         In examining the success of de-radicalization efforts aimed at Islamist extremists 
and Islamist terrorists, El-Said (2012) focuses on the programs of 8 Muslim-majority 
states: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen.48 The report identifies factors that contribute to success, including civil society; 
the use of family members to encourage participation in de-radicalization; the “role and 
quality” of the clerics and scholars that the state brings in; and the role of “popular 
support” for de-radicalization in tandem with dynamic government leadership.49  
          Also important are the “political and developmental strength of the state,” external 
aspects, such as police crackdowns on terrorist groups or military interventions, and the 
“relationship between national counter-radicalization and de-radicalization efforts.”50  
The author finds that national consensus and “the support of the government” are crucial 
for effectiveness, and that the help of civil society organizations is critical to winning 
47 I establish the core years as the years for which information on each country’s de-radicalization efforts is 
widely available. See Appendix A. Core Years of Country De-radicalization Programs. 
48 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 6. 




                                                 
over individuals and groups who may be most susceptible to become radicalized or 
pursue terrorism.51   
          Using the same set of countries, El-Said (2013) establishes a series of hypotheses 
regarding the factors that he argues may be more favorable to successful de-
radicalization.52 For instance, “states with dynamic and active [civil society 
organizations] CSOs are in a better position to enact effective Counter-derad programmes 
than those without dynamic CSOs.”53 In Algeria, CSOs played a crucial role in 
encouraging the general public as well as families of individuals who fell victim to 
terrorism to back President Bouteflika’s de-radicalization efforts.54 These organizations 
helped to build trust among victims’ families by explaining what they were entitled to as 
a result of their loss, including financial compensation, as well as by having the president 
meet with family members to get their unique perspective on how they believed they 
should be compensated.55 By pursuing a ‘whole-of-society’ rather than simply ‘a-whole-
of-government approach,’ states can overcome the distrust with which some citizens view 
the authorities, making de-radicalization more attractive to the public.56    
51 Ibid, 45. 
52 Hamed El-Said, “Introduction: Definitions and Conceptual Framework,” 10.  
53 Ibid. On page 3, the author uses “counter-derad programmes” as a blanket term to indicate that countries 
may have either counter-radicalization programs or de-radicalization programs, or both types of programs.  
54 Hamed El-Said, “Clemency, civil accord and reconciliation: the evolution of Algeria’s deradicalization 
process,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes 
and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 
40-41. 
55 Ibid, 37-40. 
56 Suleyman Ozeren and M. Alper Sozer, “Conclusion: The Multi-faceted Aspects of Radicalization,” in 
Multi-Faceted Approach to Radicalization in Terrorist Organizations, ed. Ihsan Bal, Suleyman Ozeren and 
M. Alper Sozer (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011): 210-211. 
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          Most recently, El-Said (2015) re-visits the hypotheses that he lays out in his 
previous work regarding factors that may favor successful de-radicalization.57 In addition 
to macro level considerations such as political stability and developmental strength, 
“religious rehabilitation” can make de-radicalization more successful, as learning that 
Islam does not condone suicide can “delegitimize” terrorists’ reasoning behind suicide 
attacks.58 Regarding Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), “Muslim 
scholars and religious leaders” have been effective in getting ‘ethnic and religious 
communities’ to cooperate with the government on combating Islamist extremism and 
terrorism, as religious authorities have rallied the public around the idea of defending 
themselves against a shared adversary.59  
          Similarly, Boucek, Ghez, Pettyjohn, and Rabasa (2010) find that elements such as 
offering militants access to Muslim religious texts while undergoing rehabilitation, as 
well as and providing de-radicalization program participants with emotional support and 
assistance in connecting to others who disavow extremism, can encourage Islamist 
extremists to develop a more moderate worldview.60  
          Other more micro level characteristics that may be important for successful de-
radicalization are: the role of families in convincing radical individuals to participate in 
de-radicalization programs; humane handling of prisoners to stop them from radicalizing 
further; the promotion of religious education based on extremists’ general lack of 
57 Hamed El-Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter 
Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs, 17-26. In contrast to his past works, the author focuses in 
this book on Muslim-majority as well as non-Muslim-majority states, including Australia and Singapore. 
58 Ibid, 27. 
59 Ibid, 171-172. 




                                                 
knowledge regarding Muslim law and precepts; and post-release observation and 
assistance to help ensure that detainees do not pursue terrorism again.61 
          While the majority of the literature on de-radicalization programs uses qualitative 
analysis, El-Said and Harrigan (2011) measure the total number of terrorist attacks in 34 
UN member states with de-radicalization programs, to gauge whether de-radicalization 
programs reduce terrorism.62 De-radicalization may not necessarily decrease the number 
of terrorist attacks, as in many Arab states, governments have used counterterrorism laws 
to exaggerate their authority, and resultant “repression, social and political exclusion, 
abuse of state coercive powers and increased corruption” may incite more terrorism 
rather than restrain it.63  
          Also, the authors find that none of the countries in the study possessed ‘post-
release programmes’ to assess what individuals have successfully reformed versus those 
who need additional assistance to successfully re-integrate into society.64 By tracking 
individuals once they are released from a de-radicalization program, a country can 
potentially reduce the number of terrorist attacks by continuing to monitor those 
individuals who may still possess violent Islamist extremist sympathies.    
          One debate in the literature on the success of de-radicalization concerns whether 
countries should use statistics such as recidivism rates to gauge how successful such 
programs have been at re-integrating extremists and terrorists into society. Chowdhury 
61 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El-Said, “Transforming Terrorists: Examining International 
Efforts to Address Violent Extremism,” International Peace Institute (May 2011): 17-20. The assistance 
that governments may provide after detainee release from de-radicalization programs includes financial and 
employment assistance and other related incentives. 
62 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” in Globalisation, 
Democratisation and Radicalisation in the Arab World, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (New York: 





                                                 
Fink and El-Said (2011) suggest that the UN use data on recidivism, or the rate of violent 
extremists returning to terrorism, to devise a system by which different countries can 
assess their de-radicalization efforts.65 Other scholars, including Sim (2012) are not as 
quick to rely on recidivism rates, arguing that with regard to US-initiated de-
radicalization in Afghanistan, the criteria used for measuring recidivism may not be 
robust enough to account for some former detainees who have returned to fighting.66 
Additionally, countries that are especially eager to advertise success in their 
counterterrorism efforts may purposely develop recidivism criteria that conceals a higher 
number of individuals who have resumed violence.67  
          Recidivism also does not factor in individuals who may be supporting a terrorist 
group within the confines of the law, such as by promoting the group’s internet presence, 
as well as those individuals who, rather than continuing their involvement in terrorism 
domestically, engage in terrorism-related activity in other countries.68 This phenomenon 
is relevant to de-radicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia, as although the country has 
boasted about low recidivism rates, many Islamist militants have crossed the border into 
Yemen to fight for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).69  
 
65 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El-Said, “Transforming Terrorists: Examining International 
Efforts to Address Violent Extremism,” 27.  
66 Susan Sim, “Strategies for Successful Risk Reduction Programmes for Violent Extremists: Lessons from 
Singapore, Indonesia and Afghanistan,” in Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism, ed. D.R. 
Voica (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012): 70. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, 41. 
69 Sheila A. Rom, “‘Extremist’ Rehabilitation: A Fundamental Misunderstanding? Divergent Micro and 
Macro-level Narratives Regarding Motivations of Former Guantanamo Bay ‘Extremists’ Participating in 
the Saudi Arabian De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Program,” Brussels Journal of International Studies 
10 (2013): 164. 
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          Challenges in Studying De-radicalization Initiatives Aimed at Islamist Extremists 
          and Islamist Terrorists 
         There are many challenges associated with studying de-radicalization initiatives, 
which apply to all 3 chapters of this paper. One key challenge concerns the shortage of 
data available on the characteristics and outcomes of such programs: “there is not one 
single book on the causes of de-radicalization processes. Nor is there a comprehensive 
study about the conditions under which de-radicalization can be successful.”70 De-
radicalization data may also be limited because many such programs are fairly new.71  
         Consequently, perhaps because such programs are so new, having been established 
after 9/11, “there is no consensus on what constitutes success in reforming a terrorist, let 
alone what even constitutes reform in this context.”72 Without any definitive answers, it 
is difficult to determine, for example, if an extremist has successfully reformed by not 
returning to terrorism, or if an extremist has reformed by disavowing jihadism in the 
context of a religious dialogue program.  
          Additionally, obtaining data on de-radicalization programs can be a challenge, as 
some countries may choose to keep this information close to the vest. In Malaysia, which 
has disclosed little about its de-radicalization experience, detainees can be charged with 
“violating the terms of [their] release” if they publicize any information about the 
program they are going through.73 Thus, out of fear of being reprimanded, many 
70 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 3.   
71 Mullins, Sam, “Rehabilitation of Islamist Terrorists: Lessons from Criminology,” Dynamics of 
Asymmetric Conflict (2010): 165.  
72 Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs,” 268. 




                                                 
individuals may choose not to volunteer information about their de-radicalization 
experiences to the broader public.  
          Scholars may also encounter difficulty when evaluating multiple countries’ de-
radicalization programs at once, as these programs vary broadly according to context.74 
For instance, Pakistan has directed much of its de-radicalization efforts at the Taliban, 
who has overtaken large swathes of the country, perpetuating its Islamist extremist 
doctrine wherever it rules.75 Whereas the Taliban pose a formidable challenge to the 
Government of Pakistan, having attempted to overrun the country, in countries such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands, Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists do not pose the 
same kind of existential threat.     
         Despite the challenges that exist, I think that my study overcomes these hurdles. By 
using common characteristics—including the role of civil society in de-radicalization 
efforts, developmental strength, and political stability—I can standardize my assessment 
of de-radicalization success across the 7 countries.76 While each country’s de-
radicalization efforts may be shaped by certain political and socioeconomic 
circumstances and cultural mores, I can easily determine the presence or absence of 
factors such as political stability, strong developmental capacity, and the unilateral 
74 Lindsay Clutterbuck et al., UK Home Office, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, “Individual 
disengagement from Al-Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy 
and practice in preventing terrorism,” (November 2011): 15.  
75 Tariq Parvez, “Challenges of establishing a rehabilitation programme in Pakistan,” in Terrorist 
Rehabilitation and Counter-radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism, ed. Rohan Gunaratna, 
Jolene Anne R. Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 125-132. According to Parvez, 
Pakistan does not have a formal terrorist rehabilitation or de-radicalization program, but an informal 
program was initiated in 2009 in the Malakand region, as well as the Sabawoon Rehabilitation Center, 
specifically targeted at Taliban militants.     
76 Hamed El-Said, “Introduction: Definitions and Conceptual Framework,” 10. 
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abandonment of violence by terrorist groups in all countries, either from individual 
datasets or from the case studies.  
          Regarding the influence of religious interlocutors, for example, El-Said (2013) 
finds that de-radicalization in Yemen may not have been successful because the 
program’s leadership “failed to galvanize the support” of a great number of religious 
clerics, and as a result, the country failed to achieve the “national consensus” needed to 
allow the Dialogue Committee (DC) to succeed.77 Alternatively, Saudi Arabia was the 
only country that El-Said (2013) studied in which the government was able to involve a 
considerable number of objective, well-respected, and authoritative religious officials, 
ultimately contributing to the success of the country’s program.78 Thus, despite 
contextual differences among each country’s de-radicalization efforts, it is still possible 
to make observations across all of them based on certain relevant features. 
          Furthermore, I believe that my paper addresses the shortcomings in previous 
studies, as with the exception of El-Said and Harrigan (2011), the literature on success of 
de-radicalization relies primarily on qualitative analysis.79 Whereas these previous works 
simply assess certain success factors such as political stability and developmental 
capacity through narrative case studies, I provide a more substantial base for comparison, 
as I assign each country’s attributes a value. Additionally, for the factors that may not 
already be measured in an existing dataset, including civil society involvement and the 
77 Hamed El-Said, “Conclusion,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and 
deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane 
Harrigan (London, Routledge, 2013), 266. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 265. 
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role of religious authorities, I can also assign each country a value based on the presence 
or absence of these characteristics.  
          Although El-Said and Harrigan (2011) use data on terrorist incidents, they organize 
the data by year and not by country.80 While the authors draw general conclusions about 
the high incidence of terrorism across different countries, such as the absence of ‘post-
release programmes,’ my study enables policymakers to observe what de-radicalization 
elements have or have not worked to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism in 
specific countries.81 
            Despite the fact that literature on measuring de-radicalization success has grown 
in recent years, the question at the heart of my research still remains unanswered. While 
certain scholars have evaluated the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at 
Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists based on narrative descriptions, no study has 
developed a coding scheme to quantitatively evaluate the success of these efforts across 
different countries. Also, to date, no study has attempted to measure the success of 
different countries’ de-radicalization programs against the number of terrorist attacks in 
each country. Through this chapter, I hope to inform policymakers as to what variables—
including civil society involvement and national consensus around de-radicalization—
may be favorable to successful de-radicalization, and in turn may lead to less Islamist 
terrorism.     
        
           





                                                 
          Data and Methods 
         The study includes 7 Muslim-majority countries that Hamed El-Said (2012) 
examines: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.82 I 
use quantitative analysis to determine the effect of de-radicalization on the number of 
Islamist terrorist attacks. I use a scatter plot to analyze the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, and I code the independent variable based on a 
numeric scale.83 This type of analysis is appropriate for my research question because I 
can assign each piece of information a value, and quantify the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables.  
              
          Hypothesis  
         Muslim-majority countries with more successful de-radicalization programs aimed 
at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists will experience fewer Islamist terrorist 
attacks. 
 
         Unit of analysis 
         I examine how Islamist terrorist attacks behave in response to de-radicalization 
programs intended to combat Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists.         
 
          Dependent Variable: Number of Islamist Terrorist Attacks in Each State  
         The dependent variable is the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. 
To operationalize the dependent variable, I calculate the total number of Islamist terrorist 
82 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 6.  
83 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. 
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attacks for each state during the core years that each country has de-radicalized Islamist 
extremists and Islamist terrorists. I measure the number of Islamist terrorist attacks 
during the period that each country’s de-radicalization programs have occurred, as I was 
not able to find any evidence in the literature that states may experience less terrorism 
only after they have carried out successful de-radicalization programs.84  
          By separating out the terrorist incidents that were committed by Islamist terrorist 
groups, I can gauge the effect of de-radicalization efforts on reducing Islamist terrorism, 
distinct from terrorism in a broader sense.85  
         To measure the number of Islamist terrorist attacks for each country, I use the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD).86 The GTD classifies a terrorist attack based on the 
following criteria:  
• The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious 
calculation on the part of a perpetrator. 
• The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of 
violence ‐including property violence, as well as violence 
against people. 
• The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub‐national actors. 
The database does not include acts of state terrorism.87 
            
           
84 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 263. The authors suggest 
that terrorism may decrease while a de-radicalization program is in progress. 
85 Using the “perpetrator group name” (gname), and “perpetrator sub-group name” (gsubname), I determine 
if the terrorist attacks for each state were carried out by Islamist terrorist groups. See National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: 
Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” (August 2014): 41-42. See Appendix B. Islamist Terrorist Groups. 
86 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), (2013), Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file], retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
87 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism 
Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” 8. Additionally, 2 of the following 3 factors are 
mandatory for an incident to be listed in the GTD: “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal;” some “evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims” must be present; and “the 
attack must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.” 
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          Independent Variable: Success of De-Radicalization Programs in Muslim-     
          Majority Countries 
         The independent variable in this chapter is the success of de-radicalization 
programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists in Muslim-majority 
countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I 
cannot measure the success of such programs directly, as there is not a universal set of 
standards by which to gauge this.88 Given the subjectivity of factors such as recidivism, 
directly “measuring and quantifying” success poses a “recurring problem.”89 Thus, unlike 
programs to encourage individuals to give up alcoholism, which different governments or 
organizations can measure the success of in terms of how many individuals have become 
sober, there is no obvious outcome to indicate the success of de-radicalization programs. 
          However, despite the difficulty of directly measuring success, I selected the 
countries that El-Said (2012) uses because “certain key factors” can be identified with 
regard to de-radicalization across all Muslim-majority countries.90 The presence of 
religious authorities, including scholars and clerics, for example, may be more germane 
to Muslim-majority countries because these governments are more likely to have 
established official relationships with Muslim leaders than in non-Muslim-majority 
countries.91 
          To operationalize the independent variable, I ask a series of yes or no questions, to 
determine the presence or absence of certain features in each state’s de-radicalization 
88 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 2.  
89 Ellie Hearne and Nur Laiq, “A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism,” 
International Peace Institute (June 2010): 12. 
90 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 2.  
91 Ibid, 27. 
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efforts that may be favorable to successful de-radicalization. I developed the proxy 
variables in Table 1 based on conditions that El-Said (2012)92 and El-Said (2013)93 find 
as being favorable to successful de-radicalization. For example, “de-radicalization is 
more effective and durable when ceasefire is called for by violent groups themselves, not 
the state.”94 To account for this factor, I ask for each country, “has the country’s 
experience been one in which de-radicalization has occurred through extremist groups 
denouncing violence unilaterally?”95 If the answer is yes, that country earns 2 points, and 
if the answer is no, the country earns 1 point.96 A country that earns a total of 8 points has 
a program that is least successful, while a country that earns 16 points has the most 
successful program.   
          The 8 proxy variables that I use are: a state’s developmental capacity, strength of 
political institutions, national consensus around de-radicalization, personnel required for 
religious dialogue, role of civil society, unilateral condemnation of violent action, new 
leadership at the state level, and de-radicalization funding.97 El-Said (2012) identifies the 
characteristics that he uses to determine the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs: 
By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the 
report identifies certain key factors which can be considered 
as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes.  
These include the following: the role of popular support 
combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership; 
the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and 
quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and 
developmental strength of the state is also important, as is 
the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and 
92 Ibid, 2.  
93 Hamed El-Said, “Introduction: Definitions and Conceptual Framework,” 10. 
94 Hamed El-Said, “Conclusion,” 267. 
95 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.    
96 Ibid. There is no such ranking scheme that currently exists in the de-radicalization literature.  
97 Ibid.    
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de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors 
and interventions on the other.98 
           
          To determine a state’s developmental capacity, I use the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index, which scores each country based on 
“life expectancy at birth,” “mean years of schooling,” “expected years of schooling,” and 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita purchasing power parity.99 For the first question 
in Table 1, I consider a state to have a strong developmental capacity if it falls into either 
the “very high human development” or “high human development” category.100 As the 
UNDP collects human development data from 1980 to 2013, I refer to the year(s) closest 
to which each country’s de-radicalization efforts have taken place.101 Since the core years 
of Algeria’s de-radicalization efforts were from 1997 to 2000, I use 2000 data, seeing as 
from 2000 to 2013, the country went from the medium to high development category.102  
          For the second proxy variable, strength of political institutions, I measure each 
state’s ‘fragility’ to determine whether each state is politically stable or not.103 A ‘fragile’ 
state may be characterized by “the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective 
decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services” and the failure to “interact 
98 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 2.  
99 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014, “Technical notes: 
Calculating the human development indices—graphical presentation,” (2014): 1. The life expectancy, 
education, and living standards measures are factored into, respectively, the life expectancy index, 
education index, and GNI index. These three indexes comprise the Human Development Index.   
100 Ibid, 3. Human development is very high if it is 0.800 or above, high if it is 0.700 or above, and human 
development is at a medium level if it is 0.550 or above. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions 
Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. 
101 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, “Table 2: Human development 
index trends, 1980-2013,” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-1980-
2013 (accessed March 10, 2015). 
102 Ibid.  
103 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, “What Does ‘State Fragility’ Mean?” http://ffp.statesindex.org/faq-
06-state-fragility (accessed March 13, 2015). 
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with other states as a full member of the international community.”104 For the second 
question in Table 1, I consider a country to be politically stable if the Fragile States Index 
determines that it is in the ‘stable’ or ‘sustainable’ category.105 ‘Stable’ or ‘sustainable’ 
states, unlike those in the ‘alert’ or ‘warning’ category, are less susceptible to “collapse or 
conflict.”106   
          For the rest of the proxy variables in Tables 1 and 2—national consensus around 
de-radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, role of civil society, 
unilateral condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state level, and de-
radicalization funding—I draw the answers from El-Said (2012),107 El-Said (2013),108 
Harrigan (2013),109 Barrett and El-Said (2013),110 and El-Said and Harrigan (2013).111    
104 Ibid. 
105 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, “What do the Colors and Categories in the Index and on the Map 
Signify?” http://ffp.statesindex.org/faq-05-heat-categories (accessed March 13, 2015). On a scale from 0 to 
120, a country is ‘stable’ or ‘sustainable’ if its score is 60 or below. A country is in the ‘alert’ or ‘warning’ 
category if it is 60.1 or higher. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 
1-52. 
108 Hamed El-Said, “Clemency, civil accord and reconciliation: the evolution of Algeria’s deradicalization 
process,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes 
and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (London: Routledge, 
2013), 14-49. Hamed El-Said, “Jordan’s response to jihadi Salafism,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: 
Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. 
Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (London: Routledge, 2013), 107-139. Hamed El-Said, “Yemen’s passive 
approach to countering terrorism,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and 
deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane 
Harrigan (London: Routledge, 2013), 227-260.  
109 Jane Harrigan, “The rise of religious-based radicalism and the deradicalization programme in 
Bangladesh,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization 
programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 50-73. Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” 
in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and their 
impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (London: Routledge, 2013), 140-
160. 
110 Richard Barrett and Hamed El-Said, “Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization,” in Deradicalizing 
Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim 
majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (London: Routledge, 2013), 194-226. 
111 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Group Deradicalization in Egypt: The Unfinished Agenda,” in 
Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programmes and Their 




                                                 
          The questions that I use in Table 1 regarding the role of civil society, unilateral 
condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state level, strength of political 
institutions, and a state’s developmental capacity very closely resemble the hypotheses 
that El-Said (2013) lays out.112 Concerning the role of civil society, new leadership at the 
state level, strength of political institutions, and a state’s developmental capacity, he 
argues the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Counter-derad programmes require political will and trust. 
This is achieved more easily when new, charismatic leadership that has 
weak links with powerful domestic groups opposed to reforms arrives. 
Hence, Counter-derad programmes associated with new, charismatic 
leadership at state level have more chance of success than those linked to 
the same old regimes whose policies were largely responsible for 
radicalizing large segments of the population.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Developmental states, that is, states with the ability to 
achieve sustainable growth rate, create jobs, improve equity, reduce 
corruption and manage relations with their ethnic groups are not only less 
exposed to violent extremism, they are also more able to fashion effective 
Counter-derad programmes when faced with the phenomenon of 
terrorism. 
 
Hypothesis 3: States with strong political capacity, that is, states capable 
of defending their borders and societies, maintain law and order, and set 
the rules of the game for all members of society, are more capable of 
fashioning effective Counter-derad programmes than weak states. This is 
especially the case when such programmes are accompanied by reforms to 
address some or all of the existing socioeconomic and political grievances. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Civil society organizations (CSOs) have resources to create 
and multiply social networks in ways that the state cannot. They thus have 
the ability to reach even the most recalcitrant corners of society. 
Therefore, states with dynamic and active CSOs are in a better position to 
enact effective Counter-derad programmes than those without dynamic 
CSOs. This is especially the case when CSOs are invited by the state to 
take part in the delivery of Counter-derad programmes.113 
112 Hamed El-Said, “Introduction: Definitions and Conceptual Framework,” 10. 
113 Ibid. For Question 7 in Table 1, which corresponds to the author’s first hypothesis, I only focus on 
whether a state’s leadership is new versus whether they are both new as well as charismatic. I only 
examined the case studies to gauge if the leadership was new, as new leaders may not necessarily always be 
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Additionally, El-Said (2013) posits that unilateral condemnation of violent action  
may contribute to more successful de-radicalization: 
Hypothesis 6: Counter-derad programmes have a better chance of 
succeeding and enduring when ceasefire, renunciation of violence and call 
for peace is initiated unconditionally from violent extremist groups and 
not the state.114 
 
   
            For the questions that I devised regarding national consensus around de-
radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, and de-radicalization funding, I 
rely on arguments that El-Said (2012)115 and Barrett and El-Said (2013) put forward.116  
For Question 3 in Table 1, I reason that national consensus will contribute to more 
successful de-radicalization efforts: “First, national consensus behind such [de-
radicalization] policies is vital for their effectiveness.”117 Although national leaders may 
devise de-radicalization policy, effectively enforcing such policy requires a common 
desire to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism.   
          Regarding religious influence in Question 4, I argue that a greater number of 
qualified religious authorities will favor more successful de-radicalization, as religious 
charismatic, and charismatic leaders may not always be new. Additionally, I did not want Question 7 to be 
too similar to Question 3, regarding national consensus around de-radicalization.     
114 Ibid. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization 
Programs. I do not use Hypothesis 5 in my paper regarding the timing of de-radicalization programs 
because the variable may not be conducive to a “yes” or “no” answer. While El-Said posits that countries 
executing de-radicalization programs in a positive regional or global environment will be more successful, 
it is difficult to contextualize what is a negative versus a positive external environment. While there may be 
relative peace in a region where a country is performing de-radicalization, an interstate conflict in another 
part of the world may undermine that region’s ability to financially or materially support de-radicalization 
efforts in the aforementioned country. 
 
115 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 
45.  
116 Richard Barrett and Hamed El-Said, “Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization,” 211-221. See Table 
1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. 




                                                 
authorities can earn the respect of Islamist extremists and terrorists especially if they 
share a common heritage: “Indeed, one of the most notable features of the Saudi 
deradicalization programme is the participation of distinguished scholars, scientists and 
clerics.”118 If religious authorities are able to relate to the detainees, they may stand a 
better chance of convincing them that their radical or violent interpretation of Islam is 
distorted and in need of revision.    
          Lastly, for Question 8 in Table 1, de-radicalization programs that are free of 
Western influence may be more successful because these programs may reflect a better 
understanding of a country’s specific social, political, and cultural context: “While 
counter-radicalization and deradicalization cannot be isolated from the external-global 
environment, success at the end of the day must be achieved internally, derived from and 
dependent upon the cultural, financial, mores and traditional ‘tool kit’ of each 
country.”119 By posing a series of questions, I can further substantiate the success 
rankings for each country’s de-radicalization efforts.120 















118 Richard Barrett and Hamed El-Said, “Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization,” 211. 
119 Ibid, 221.  
120 See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria. 
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Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization   
  Programs 
1. Does the country possess a strong developmental capacity (is the country high- performing in 
terms of life expectancy, educational attainment, and standards of living)? 
2. Does the country possess strong political institutions (is the state politically stable)? 
3. Has the state been able to build national consensus in support of its de-radicalization    
efforts? 
4. Has the state been able to bring together a substantial number of qualified religious advisers,  
clerics, messengers, and scholars to facilitate religious dialogue as part of the state’s de-
radicalization program? 
5. Has civil society played a role in helping to accomplish the goals of de-radicalization (such as 
by helping to promote policies of national reconciliation)? 
6. Has the country’s experience been one in which de-radicalization has occurred through 
extremist groups denouncing violence unilaterally? 
7. Have de-radicalization programs coincided with the arrival of new state leadership in the 
country?  
8. Have the country’s de-radicalization efforts not relied on Western economic or technical 
      assistance to run such programs, or have such efforts been otherwise free of Western  
      influence? 
  Sources: El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013. 
             
Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria 
           ALG BAN EGY JOR MAL SAU YEM 
QUESTION 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 
QUESTION 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
QUESTION 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
QUESTION 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
QUESTION 5 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 
QUESTION 6 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
QUESTION 7 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
QUESTION 8 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
TOTAL 12 11 10 10 10 12 8 
Sources: Barrett and El-Said 2013, El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Harrigan 2013. 
Note: ALG=Algeria, BAN=Bangladesh, EGY=Egypt, JOR=Jordan, MAL=Malaysia, SAU=Saudi Arabia, 
YEM=Yemen.  
 
            Data Analysis 
         I calculated descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. The 
sample size for each variable is 7, for the 7 Muslim-majority countries. As Table 3 
illustrates, the minimum number of Islamist terrorist attacks is 0, as Malaysia did not 
experience any Islamist terrorist attacks during the years that I study its de-radicalization 
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efforts, from 2001 to 2010. Algeria, alternatively, had the maximum number of Islamist 
terrorist attacks, with 256 from 1997 to 2000.121 
 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success          
 N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable 
(Islamist terrorist attacks) 




7 10.4 8 12 
  Sources: Barrett and El-Said 2013, El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Global Terrorism  
  Database 2013, Harrigan 2013. 
 
           
          Analysis of Relationship Between the Independent and Dependent Variables 
          As Figure 1 demonstrates, the dependent variable, number of Islamist terrorist 
attacks, has a positive relationship to the independent variable, success of each country’s 
de-radicalization efforts. The more successful that each country’s de-radicalization efforts 
are, the greater number of Islamist terrorist attacks each country will experience. The 
relationship between the two variables is strong, as the correlation is 0.536673299.122   
121 See Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success. 
122 See Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success. After testing the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable without Algeria, I came up with a very similar correlation 
value, 0.517697104. Thus, de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the factors that may contribute 
to success actually result in more Islamist terrorism, even when this country is not included.   
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           Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success  
             Correlation= 0.536673299 
             Sources: Barrett and El-Said 2013, El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Global  
             Terrorism Database 2013, Harrigan 2013. 
           
          One country that fits my hypothesis well is Saudi Arabia, as its de-radicalization 
efforts have been relatively successful, at 12 out of 16 points, while experiencing only 19 
Islamist terrorist attacks.123 One reason that Saudi de-radicalization efforts may have 
been so successful is because the country has been able to attract many religious clerics 
to encourage Islamist extremists to moderate: “In these [religious dialogue] conferences, 
Saudi authorities work closely with key religious figures from inside and outside the 
Kingdom to undermine the militant’s narrative, expose their limited understanding of 
religion and highlight their deviant behaviour and practices.”124  
          Saudi Arabia’s security services have also used religious clerics in investigating 
suspected terrorists: “Religious figures have successfully been used to encourage 
suspected Islamist militants to confess or to urge defendants to cooperate with 
123 Ibid. 
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authorities.”125 Perhaps Saudi Arabia has experienced less Islamist terrorism because 
religious clerics have earned the respect of detainees in the country’s de-radicalization 
program, who view these clerics as possessing the religious upper hand.  
          Additionally, it is possible that Saudi Arabia has been more successful at de-
radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists as its de-radicalization efforts have 
not been molded by the West: “Saudi Arabia has developed effective counter-
radicalization and deradicalization policies not only without Western financial and 
technical support, but also by distancing itself from Western leaders.”126 Scholars and 
other Muslim authorities who help lead de-radicalization efforts have the advantage of 
coming from a similar sociocultural background to the detainees, sharing their same 
grievances against the Saudi regime.127 Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization success suggests 
that detainees view the program’s non-Western leaders with greater legitimacy, as they 
are not doing the bidding of Western governments. 
          Unlike Saudi Arabia, one country that does not fit my hypothesis well is Algeria, as 
although its success ranking was relatively high, at 12 out of 16 points, the country 
experienced 256 Islamist terrorist attacks between 1997 and 2000.128 Despite achieving a 
relatively high success ranking, the country may have experienced such a high number of 
Islamist terrorist attacks due to a resurgence of some terrorist groups, such as the Armed 
125 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” in Leaving Terrorism 
Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (London: Routledge, 
2009), 214. 
126 Hamed El-Said and Richard Barrett, “Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization,” 221. Despite the 
authors’ contention that Saudi Arabia’s has practiced de-radicalization without Western influence, the 
Saudi Arabian Government has produced “documentary films concerning repentant terrorists” in 
cooperation with the UN. See United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, “United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy,” (April 
2012): 10.  
127 Hamed El-Said and Richard Barrett, “Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization,” 211. 
128 See Figure 1. Success of De-radicalization Programs and Islamist Terrorist Attacks. 
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Islamic Group (GIA), as well as the emergence of the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Fighting (GSPC).129  
          While the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) was undergoing its de-radicalization 
process during those years, the GIA and GSPC were becoming more radical: “The further 
radicalization of some members of the GIA led to the birth of a new, more radical splinter 
group in September 1998, the Groupe salafiste pour la predication et le combat – 
GSPC.”130 From 1997 to 2000, nearly a quarter of all Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria 
were carried out by the GIA.131 During the same period, the AIS was not responsible for 
any terrorist attacks in the country.132 As the AIS was de-radicalizing, it appears that the 
heightened activity of other Islamist terrorist groups helps to explain the high incidence 
of Islamist terrorist attacks.   
          Islamist terrorist groups such as the GIA and GSPC may have also carried out 
terrorism in response to the government’s inability to provide adequate social services, 
resulting in a ‘failed educational system, sub-standard healthcare delivery system, and 
widespread poverty’ that ‘significantly weakened political legitimacy.’133 Without jobs to 
occupy their time and sustain them financially, many Algerians joined the Islamist cause 
against the state: “the phenomenal and surprising expansion of the Islamist movement in 
the 1980s and early 1990s ‘and its ability to acquire a mass base should be understood in 
terms of the alienation of many young Algerians from a state which seemed no longer to 
129 Hamed El-Said, “Clemency, civil accord and reconciliation: the evolution of Algeria’s deradicalization 
process,” 30. 
130 Ibid. 
131 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Approximately 22.7 percent 
of terrorist attacks in the country from 1997 to 2000 were carried out by the GIA.   
132 Ibid. 




                                                 
offer them prospects.’”134 Such dire socioeconomic conditions enabled the GIA and 
GSPC to thrive, as these violent Islamist groups provided ordinary Algerians with a 
greater life purpose.  
 
         Alternative Explanations 
         As my results demonstrate, the proxy variables that I use based on what El-Said 
(2012) originally determined may be favorable to successful de-radicalization may not 
fully explain why states have more or less Islamist terrorist attacks.135 Perhaps it is the 
case that quantitative factors such as the number of terrorist incidents do not completely 
capture how successful or unsuccessful de-radicalization programs are.136 A country may 
experience more Islamist terrorism because, for example, there is a decrease in security 
personnel; surveillance equipment may be outdated and unable to effectively monitor 
militants; or because a country is unwilling to use force to deter terrorist activity.137 Thus, 
de-radicalization programs, including those that are more successful, may not fully 
explain why a country has more or less Islamist terrorism. 
          Additionally, although some countries may have more successful de-radicalization 
programs because such countries have more terrorism to begin with, more successful de-
radicalization efforts may not necessarily result in less terrorism. Algeria, for example, 
134 Ibid. 
135 Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 
2. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. 
136 Hamed El-Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter 
Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs, 260. 
137 Ibid, 260-261. 
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has experienced an extremely high rate of terrorism since the 1990s, especially compared 
to other countries.138  
          While El-Said (2013)139 argues that the country’s de-radicalization program has 
been effective, given the prominent role of CSOs in galvanizing public sentiment around 
such policies and the arrival of new, dynamic state leadership to reinvigorate de-
radicalization efforts, Algeria nevertheless experienced 256 Islamist terrorist attacks 
during the core years of its program.140 This figure was much greater than the number of 
Islamist terrorist attacks that other countries in my study experienced, as the next highest 
was Bangladesh, with 26.141 Evidently, despite having an allegedly effective de-
radicalization program, a country may still have more terrorist incidents than others while 
de-radicalization is occurring, if there is more terrorism in that country in the first place. 
          While some countries may be more prone to terrorism in general, more successful 
de-radicalization programs may actually lead to a greater number of Islamist terrorist 
attacks because despite the relationship described in the literature, there may be no such 
relationship in the real world. Although El-Said and Harrigan (2011) posit that de-
radicalization may affect the number of terrorist incidents in a country, more successful 
de-radicalization programs may not actually produce less terrorism.142 Perhaps it is that 
certain proxy variables for success, such as high socioeconomic development, do not 
relate to the number of terrorist attacks. Alleviating poverty, for example, may not deter 
an individual from pursuing terrorism because they are compelled by feelings of social or 
138 Hamed El-Said, “Clemency, civil accord and reconciliation: the evolution of Algeria’s deradicalization 
process,” 14. 
139 Ibid, 41. 
140 See Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 264-265. 
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cultural alienation. Likewise, the participation of qualified religious authorities in de-
radicalization efforts may not convince the most hardened Islamist extremists to not 
pursue terrorism, as these most committed individuals may be so dedicated to their 
radical beliefs that they will carry out terrorism at any cost.             
          While more successful de-radicalization programs, based on the proxy variables 
that I use, do not correspond to less Islamist terrorism, other considerations may better 
account for why different countries experience less Islamist terrorist attacks. First, IO 
membership may be related to the number of terrorist attacks, as Europol, for example, 
enhances regional counterterrorism efforts by facilitating the exchange of best practices 
among national police agencies.143 As a result of support from Europol, Belgium and 
France established a “joint investigation team (JIT) to counter Islamist terrorism.”144  
          Perhaps Malaysia has not experienced any Islamist terrorist attacks between 2001 
and 2010 because the country “engage[s] with its neighbors on issues related to 
counterterrorism and transnational crime,” and has trained “Malaysian security officials” 
on terrorism through its “Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism 
(SEARCCT).”145 By exchanging best practices with its neighbors, Malaysia has enabled 
its own security forces to better fight terrorism, leading to less attacks. IO membership, 
therefore, may better explain the absence of Islamist terrorist attacks, given Malaysia’s 
only moderate success with de-radicalization, at 10 out of 16 points.146  
143 Mathieu Deflem, “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global 
Perspective,” Justice Quarterly 23 (September 2006): 339. 
144 Europol, “Annual Report,” (2007): 55. 
145 US Department of State, “Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” (published 
April 30, 2009) http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122413.htm (accessed March 22, 2015). 
146 See Figure 1. Success of De-radicalization Programs and Islamist Terrorist Attacks. 
39 
 
                                                 
          While the IO membership explanation for less terrorism may be compelling, so too 
may be a state’s degree of religious freedom.147 Specifically, Saiya and Scime (2014) 
find that “with a few exceptions, religious terrorism increases dramatically as the level of 
religious restrictions also increases.”148 In Algeria and Egypt, they find, “the suppression 
of religion had the effect of driving religious discontent underground, where it became 
radicalized and ultimately confronted the state through violence.”149 The authors include 
Islamist terrorist groups in their definition of religious terrorists, as they mention the GIA 
and Egypt’s Takfir wal-Hijra.150  
          Perhaps Bangladesh experienced the second highest number of Islamist terrorist 
attacks among the countries in my study, 26, in part because of the government’s 
significant restraints on religious practice.151 For instance, the country’s High Court 
banned all fatwas, or “legal rulings based on Shari’a,” so that “village religious leaders” 
and other individuals could not arbitrarily establish their own religious rulings.152 
Religious restrictions may have motivated Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh to respond 
with violence, as the issuing of fatwas, especially regarding jihad, is a major point of 
contention between Islamist terrorists and the states in which they operate.  
          Thirdly, as I elaborate on more in Chapter 2, regime type may influence the number 
of terrorist attacks in different countries. Specifically concerning Islamist terrorism, 
147 Nilay Saiya and Anthony Scime, “Explaining religious terrorism: A data-mined analysis,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 31 (February 2014): 19. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid, 7. 
150 Ibid, 6. 
151 Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), “National Profiles: Bangladesh,” 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_19_1.asp (accessed March 22, 2015). See 
Figure 1. Success of De-radicalization Programs and Islamist Terrorist Attacks. 
152 US Department of State, “Bangladesh, International Religious Freedom Report 2010,” (published 
November 17, 2010) http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148789.htm (accessed March 22, 2015). 
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Windsor (2003) contends that countries in the Middle East can curb this phenomenon by 
introducing democracy: “democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful 
reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, 
can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the recent rise of Islamist 
extremism.”153  
          In Egypt, a lack of democracy contributed to the IG’s “insurgency” against the 
state in the mid to late 1990s, as “a response to the Islamists’ exclusion” from politics.154 
The IG began its campaign of terrorist attacks, including against national leaders, to 
express its agitation at the government influencing the country’s “electoral law” to 
diminish the power of Islamists, namely the MB.155 Perhaps alternative factors such as 
Egypt’s lack of democracy can help to explain the incidence of Islamist terrorist attacks 
there, as the country’s de-radicalization success ranking was not very telling, at 10 out of 
16 points.156   
                                      
         Conclusion 
         As the results enumerate, de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the factors 
that may be favorable to success result in a greater number of Islamist terrorist attacks. 
Although the relationship between de-radicalization success and Islamist terrorism is 
153 Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 
26 (Summer 2003): 43. 
154 Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Terrorism and the Middle East Democratic Deficit: Political Exclusion, 
Repression and the Causes of Extremism,” Democratization 13 (June 2006): 518. The IG is also known as 
the Gamaa Islamiya. 
155 Ibid. The IG also carried out terrorist attacks against Egypt in the mid to late 1990s as a result of state 
repression. I focus specifically on the relationship between state repression and de-radicalization in Chapter 
2.  
156 See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria. 
41 
 
                                                 
significant, other variables, including IO membership, religious freedom, and regime type 
may better illustrate why countries experience less Islamist terrorist attacks.  
There was an especially high number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria, as at the 
time, several other Islamist terrorist groups beside the AIS were still active. By contrast, 
the presence in Saudi Arabia of certain factors that may be favorable to success, 
including a large number of religious authorities to support de-radicalization and a lack of 
Western influence, may explain its lower incidence of Islamist terrorism. 
          I believe that comparing success across Muslim-majority countries is advantageous 
because certain factors, such as the ability to attract a large number of religious 
authorities, are more relevant to a Muslim-majority state. Alternatively, it may be 
difficult to adapt the same factors that may be favorable to success to non-Muslim-
majority countries, as I would not expect these states to have as close or as established 
official relationships to the Muslim community. In future research, perhaps I could 
examine the factors that may be contribute to successful de-radicalization in non-Muslim-
majority countries. However, I believe that it is too early to undertake such a study, as de-
radicalization for Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists has not existed for that long. 
          Also, I could re-test my hypothesis in the future by examining whether a more 
nuanced measure of Islamist terrorist attacks would make a difference in my results. 
Instead of simply using the number of attacks, I could measure the rate of Islamist 
terrorist attacks per 100,000 people to more easily compare how much Islamist terrorism 
various countries experience. Otherwise, it is difficult to make judgements about how 
much Islamist terrorism each country has experienced compared to others since the totals 
vary so widely. By using a more nuanced measure, perhaps I could find that de-
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radicalization programs with more factors favorable to success do produce less Islamist 
terrorism. 
          In examining how Islamist terrorism is affected by political stability, 
developmental strength, and additional features that may be favorable to successful de-
radicalization, I wish to help policymakers become cognizant of certain de-radicalization 
elements that may reduce Islamist terrorism within their own country settings. By 
assessing what factors may have been more conducive to certain countries’ de-
radicalization success, policymakers can try to adapt these practices, such as civil society 
involvement, to their own efforts. Although no de-radicalization program can achieve 
perfection, certain factors may favor more successful de-radicalization efforts, which in 



























Chapter 2. Holding Down the Fort? Government Repression and the Success of De-
radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority States 
 
          
         Getting Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists to de-radicalize is no easy task, and 
occasionally, states will employ repressive measures such as arrests, torture, and harsh 
prison conditions to compel these individuals to renounce terrorism or renounce their 
extremist ideology. The state has used repression to try to convince Islamist terrorists and 
Islamist extremists to de-radicalize in the Algerian and Egyptian contexts, and in the 
Egyptian context especially, terrorists realized that the costs of continuing terrorism were 
much too high. In this vein, terrorists may choose to no longer pursue terrorism as the 
persistent application of repressive measures may diminish their will to fight.          
         This chapter, through a cross-country comparison, asks what the effect of state 
repression is on the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists 
and Islamist terrorists in Muslim-majority countries. I use the same countries that I do in 
Chapter 1, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen. I posit that Muslim-majority countries with more state repression will have more 
successful de-radicalization programs. State repression can contribute to more successful 
de-radicalization in Muslim-majority countries, for example, by making Islamist 
terrorists reappraise their violent behavior in response to harsh prison conditions, arrests, 
detention, torture, and other repressive methods.   
         To examine the relationship between state repression and the success of de-
radicalization, I use the same scheme as I do in Chapter 1 to determine how successful 
countries’ de-radicalization programs have been based on certain factors. To measure 
state repression, I use each country’s level of freedom. I find that as a country’s level of 
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state repression increases, the success ranking of each de-radicalization program also 
increases, although there is not a strong relationship. Subsequently, I examine whether 
alternative explanations such as charismatic leadership and incentives, including the 
release of terrorist prisoners, more effectively illustrate why some de-radicalization 
programs may be more successful than others.   
 
          State Repression and De-radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist  
         Terrorists 
         Although the literature does not explore the relationship between state repression 
and de-radicalization as much as the relationship between state repression and 
radicalization, Ashour (2009) examines how repression may lead de-radicalization 
programs aimed at Islamist extremists and terrorists to be more successful.157 State 
repression, which involves violating or restricting political rights and civil liberties, 
includes ‘actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or 
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a 
cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be 
challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.’158 The term bundles 
together a number of different violent and non-violent activities that authorities can 
initiate, including physical sanctions, arrests, illegal detention, torture, assassinations, 
mass killings, political surveillance, and domestic spying.159  
157 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 100. 
158 Christian Davenport and Molly Inman, “The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s,” 
Theoretical and Empirical Progress in Research on Political Science 24 (2012): 620. 
159 Ibid.  
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         Some scholars, including Ashour (2009) examine how state repression has played a 
role in causing certain terrorist group leaders to initiate de-radicalization programs.160 By 
imposing a high cost on Islamist terrorism, repression purportedly disincentives terrorists, 
as “de-radicalization demonstrates that the individual is not willing to accept the high 
costs to pursue his ideological goal (because he is morally against the method or because 
the goal is not as important).”161 Ashour (2009) identifies “state repression directed 
against the armed movement” as one factor necessary not only to the initiation but to the 
“success of a de-radicalization process within armed Islamist movements.”162 As Egypt 
experienced several unsuccessful attempts at de-radicalization, the first successful 
attempt was made by the IG from 1997 to 2002.163 Although the IG initiated the ceasefire 
internally, the state put its full support behind the de-radicalization effort, referring in the 
media to the ceasefire as the Initiative for Ceasing Violence (ICV).164 Before the IG’s 
1997 ceasefire, there were at least 14 attempts to stop the violence between the IG and 
Egypt.165  
          State repression led to de-radicalization in the IG’s case because “repression forced 
the IG leadership to reassess the costs and the benefits of violently confronting the 
Egyptian regime. They have found that the costs of the confrontation outweigh the 
benefits.”166 IG detainees recognized that violent jihad was antithetical to Islam, and that 
160 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 100. 
161 Lawrence Rubin, “Non-kinetic Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: A Case Study of Egypt and the 
Islamic Group,” in Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation, ed. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Anne 
R. Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin (New York: Routledge, 2011), 33. 
162 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 16. 
163 Ibid, 50-51. 
164 Ibid, 51. 
165 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Group Deradicalization in Egypt: The Unfinished Agenda,” 84. 
166 Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An Inquiry Into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist 
Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group,” Middle East Journal 61 (2007): 621. 
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confronting the Egyptian regime through such violent means was too costly. Responding 
with severe punishment can deter violent action by terrorist groups, by conveying the 
message that continued terrorism can come with undesirable ramifications.167  
          In a repressive state such as Egypt, where severe punishment for participation in 
terrorism is the norm, the prospect of being incarcerated or executed, or of being forced 
to undergo de-radicalization, can convince terrorist groups that continuing terrorism is 
not in their best interest. IG leaders in particular were subjected to “extreme physical, 
mental and psychological pressures.”168 Given the “long, indiscriminate, and more 
intense” state repression starting in 1992, in the form of harsh prison conditions such as 
malnutrition, and beatings that sometimes resulted in death of prisoners, IG members saw 
the revision of their extremist ideology as a way to extricate themselves from such 
austere circumstances.169   
         Contrary to the notion that highly repressive states can facilitate more successful 
de-radicalization programs, some scholars assert that more democratic states lead to less 
terrorism.170 Electoral participation may reduce transnational terrorism by mitigating 
citizen grievances, preventing recruitment of terrorists, and by promoting public 
awareness of national counterterrorism strategies and related policies.171 Less democratic 
participation, in contrast, can create a political impasse, and can increase friction among 
marginalized groups, which may lead to violence.172 Democratic societies may not 
167 Laura Dugan and Gary Lafree, “Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism,” Crime and Justice 
38 (2009): 423-424. 
168 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 101. 
169 Ibid,100-101. 
170 Quan Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49 (2005): 281. 
171 Ibid, 294. 
172 Ibid.  
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experience as much violent extremism as authoritarian ones, as citizens’ ability to 
participate in government and air their concerns through elected officials diminishes the 
usefulness of violence to achieve substantive political, social, or economic ends.  
          The literature also contends that newly democratic states may experience more 
terrorism than established democratic states, as the “transition period to democratic 
governance” is characterized as being one of the greatest periods of instability for new 
democracies.173 While India and South Africa are considered to be democracies, both 
countries have a high incidence of international terrorism, as they are considered “nations 
in transition” economically and politically.174 Gause (2005) develops the democracy-
terrorism argument further by arguing that regime type is not the ultimate determinant of 
terrorism, as ISIS and Al Qaeda are “not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; 
they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state.”175 This reality is currently 
playing out in Iraq, where ISIS has shown that it is willing to establish a state governed 
by Shari’a law at any cost. 
          As Dugan, Korte, and LaFree (2009) suggest, heavy-handed state responses to 
terrorism can occur in democratic as well as authoritarian contexts.176 Studying various 
British police and military responses to terrorism by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
from 1969 to 1992, the authors find that in some cases, the use of hard power has resulted 
173 Dan G. Cox, John Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse, Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and 
Africa, (Lebanon: Northeastern University Press, 2009): 34. 
174 Ibid, 52-55. The study finds that newly democratic countries have a strong relationship to the incidence 
of international terrorism in these countries. Alternatively, the relationship between new democracies and 
domestic terrorism, the study finds, is relatively small. Democracy scores are measured using the Polity 
index. International terror attacks, in contrast to domestic ones, “emanate outside the target state.” 
175 F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84 (September-October 
2005): 62. 
176 Laura Dugan, Raven Korte, and Gary Lafree, “The Impact of British Counterterror Strategies on 




                                                 
in “backlash,” or “net increases in these [terrorist] attacks.”177 In the “Gibralter incident,” 
where British authorities executed 3 IRA members “as part of a planned military 
operation,” there were “positive increases in terrorist attacks 36 months after it 
occurred.”178 Given Great Britain’s disproportionate show of force, the IRA was able to 
rally greater support for its cause by casting its fallen members as “martyrs.”179 As the 
British military reaction against the IRA proves, state repression can incite more 
terrorism by encouraging greater support for a radical cause, rather than diminish it by 
forcing terrorists to re-assess their actions.    
          State repression has also fueled radicalization and terrorism in the case of the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN) against French colonialism in Algeria.180 When Algerians 
engaged in peaceful protests “demanding an end to fascism and colonialism,” the French 
responded by executing tens of thousands of protesters and orchestrated “mass arrests and 
detentions.”181 The FLN was able to capitalize on the anger that Algerians were feeling 
as a result of the French massacres: “By this point, the die had been cast for an 
uncompromising, and indeed violent, anti-colonial struggle, which took the form of the 
increasingly desperate and bloody Algerian War for Independence.”182 Today, North 
African regimes have applied similar “repressive practices” such as torture, which has 
contributed to “violent radicalization among North Africans” and has led some to “join 
177 Ibid, 19-20. 
178 Ibid, 27-36. 
179 Ibid, 36. Specifically, the authors say that the “republicans” were able to represent the fallen IRA 
members as “martyrs.” 
180 Jonathan Githens-Mazer, “The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North African 
Radicalization,” International Affairs 85 (September 2009): 1019. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid, 1019-1020. Some of the largest massacres occurred from 1945, when Algeria and France signed an 
armistice, to 1955.   
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other foreign jihadis in Afghanistan.”183 Perhaps these contemporary torture practices 
also help to explain support among North Africans for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), which has been responsible for attacking Western interests in Algeria and other 
North African states.       
          Despite the existing scholarship, the question at the heart of my research still 
remains unanswered. Although scholars have recently focused on the success of de-
radicalization programs in Muslim-majority countries, the effect of state repression on the 
success of such programs has not been systematically measured. Today, there is no 
dataset that measures state repression against a numeric measure of different countries’ 
success with de-radicalization. Through my research, I can advise policymakers as to 
whether state repression matters in the success of de-radicalization, and if so, to what 
extent it has helped Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists to reform themselves and 
re-enter mainstream society. 
              
          Data and Methods 
         This study includes the same countries that I examine in Chapter 1, including 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I use 
quantitative analysis to determine the effect of state repression on the success of de-
radicalization programs in these countries. To test the dependent variable, I use the same 
scheme to measure the success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts that I do in 
Chapter 1.184 For the independent variable, I use a numerical measure of each state’s 
183 Ibid, 1022-1023. 
184 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs, and 
Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria. 
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level of repression.185 I use a scatter plot to illustrate the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable.  
 
         Hypothesis  
         Muslim-majority countries with greater state repression will have more successful 
de-radicalization programs to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism. 
     
         Unit of Analysis 
         I will examine how Muslim-majority countries behave in terms of the success of de-
radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists, in light of state repression.  
 
           Dependent Variable: Success of De-Radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority  
         Countries 
         The dependent variable is the success of de-radicalization programs in Muslim-
Majority countries. To operationalize this variable, I use the same Chapter 1 proxy 
variables, which are: a state’s developmental capacity, strength of political institutions, 
national consensus around de-radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, 
role of civil society, unilateral condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state 
level, and de-radicalization funding.186 
            
          
185 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2013 Methodology Summary,” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2013/methodology (accessed Feb. 28th, 2013).  
186 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.    
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          Independent Variable: State Repression in Muslim-Majority Countries 
         The independent variable is state repression in each country. To operationalize this 
variable, I use data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report to measure the 
mean freedom score for the core years during which I study each country’s de-
radicalization program.187 Freedom House measures each country’s political rights and 
civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 indicating the most free, and 7 indicating the least 
free.188 I measure the freedom rating, or the average of the political rights and civil 
liberties ratings, against the dependent variable to gauge the extent to which state 
repression affects de-radicalization success.189 
          
         Data Analysis 
         I calculate descriptive statistics for both the independent and dependent variables. 
The sample size for each variable is 7, for the 7 Muslim-majority countries in the study. 
The minimum for the dependent variable, success of state programs, is 8, as Yemen 
received the lowest success ranking for its program, lacking all of the 8 characteristics 
that may be conducive to de-radicalization success.190 Alternatively, the maximum for 
the dependent variable is 12, as Algeria possessed the greatest number of characteristics 
that may explain de-radicalization success, including the unilateral disarmament of 
187 Freedom House, (2015), Freedom in the World, “Individual country ratings and status, FIW 1973-2015” 
[Data file], https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VRhituH3YmJ. 
188 “Freedom in the World 2013 Methodology Summary.”  
189 Ibid. The freedom rating is coded as follows: free (1.0 to 2.5), partly free (3.0 to 5.0), and not free (5.5 to 
7.0). 
190 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. 
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extremist groups in the country, national consensus in support of de-radicalization efforts, 
and a civil society presence in facilitating de-radicalization.191  
         Table 4 illustrates that for the independent variable, state repression, the minimum 
is 3.9, since Bangladesh is a partly free country.192 By contrast, the maximum for the 
independent variable is 6.8, as Saudi Arabia is not free, and has the highest level of state 
repression among the 7 countries in the study.193    
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression 
 N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
(success of state de-
radicalization programs) 











  Sources: Barrett and El-Said 2013, El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Freedom House 2015, 
  Harrigan 2013.       
        
         Analysis of Relationship Between the Independent and Dependent Variables 
         As Figure 2 demonstrates, the dependent variable, success of state de-radicalization 
programs, has a positive relationship with the independent variable, level of state 
repression. As state repression increases, the success of de-radicalization programs 
increases. The relationship between the two variables is not strong, however, as the 
correlation value is 0.250266257.194  
 
191 See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria. Saudi Arabia also 
achieved a score of 12 for the success of its de-radicalization efforts. 
192 See Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression. 
 
193 Ibid. 
194 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression. 
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                              Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression 
                              Correlation=0.250266257 
                           Note: ALG=Algeria, BAN=Bangladesh, EGY=Egypt, JOR=Jordan, MAL=Malaysia,  
                           SAU=Saudi Arabia, YEM=Yemen. PF=partly free, NF=not free. 
                           Sources: Barrett and El-Said 2013, El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan  
                           2013, Freedom House 2015, Harrigan 2013. 
 
         With regard to Figure 2, Saudi Arabia aligns with my hypothesis well, as its level of 
state repression is 6.8 or “not free,” and its success ranking is 12 out of 16, above the 
mean for the variable, 10.4.195 In response to AQAP-led terrorism, especially between 
2003 and 2007, Saudi authorities executed several AQAP leaders, while “other senior 
leaders surrendered or were captured.”196 Although Islamist terrorists in Saudi Arabia 
have been motivated to violence mainly out of a desire to establish an Islamic state rather 
than because of grievances against the regime, Saudi authorities have nevertheless been 
able to combat jihadism with repression, co-optation, and by appeasing the opposition 
through inducements.197  
195 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression, and Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-
radicalization Success and State Repression. 
196 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, 57. 
197 Sheila A. Rom, “‘Extremist’ Rehabilitation: A Fundamental Misunderstanding? 
Divergent Micro and Macro-level Narratives Regarding Motivations of Former Guantanamo Bay 
‘Extremists’ Participating in the Saudi Arabian De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Program,” 162-163. 



























Success of State De-radicalization Programs
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          Perhaps Saudi Arabia has been able to stop extremist and terrorist detainees from 
re-offending at a rate of nearly 80 percent because “the government is the legitimate 
entity entrusted with the ability to exercise force and make determinations about what 
constitutes religiously acceptable behavior.”198 Saudi Arabia may partially owe its de-
radicalization success to AQAP members realizing that the costs outweigh the advantages 
in terms of continuing terrorism, given state repression.  
          By contrast, one country that does not fit my hypothesis well is Jordan, as it was 
ranked at 5 for its freedom rating or “not free,” and the success of its program was 10 out 
of 16, below the mean for the variable.199 Repression by Jordanian authorities may only 
fuel radicalization in Jordan further, as new laws prohibiting speeches in mosques, more 
stringent controls on charities and the media, as well as limits on the activities of 
professional associations have led to a rise in the number of jihadist Salafists, who are not 
willing to cooperate with the regime, and will use violence to achieve political ends.200 
The jihadist Salafists are openly opposed to the MB in Jordan, as the MB is an Islamist 
social movement that has “increasingly associated with the Jordanian regime and its 
policies.”201 The MB’s alignment with the Jordanian regime has caused mainstream 
198 Ibid, 169-173. 
199 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression, and Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-
radicalization Success and State Repression. 
200 Pénélope Larzillière, “Political Commitment Under An Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations 
and the Islamist Movement as Alternative Arenas in Jordan,” International Journal of Conflict and 
Violence 6 (2012): 21. Since 2011, jihadist Salafists organized meetings and demonstrations, which in some 
cases have led to violent confrontations with police and mass arrests.  
201 Ibid, 20-21. The MB in Jordan can be viewed as a social movement, as it has been able to influence 
citizens to support its cause, but has not effectively been able to transform itself into a political opposition 
force capable of confronting the authoritarian regime. 
55 
 
                                                 
Islamism to weaken, and has fostered support for more radical Islamist groups, including 
the Salafi jihadists, in recent years.202   
          Whereas the Jordanian Government believes that Islamist terrorism is a security 
issue borne from Islamist radicalization, the MB and other politically-affiliated Islamist 
groups contend that the government’s consequent measures to repress political freedoms 
have been counterproductive.203 Furthermore, Jordanian scholars such as Ibrahim 
Gharbiya argue that the government’s anti-extremist message has not penetrated into the 
more radicalized communities, as the government’s strategy has not involved “reach[ing] 
the sources of violence and crime.”204 Jordan’s de-radicalization approach of countering 
extremist ideology can triumph only if authorities address factors that underlie 
radicalization, such as unemployment and political disenfranchisement. 
          The country that refutes my hypothesis the most is Yemen, as while it is “not free,” 
with a freedom rating of 5.4, it has also experienced the least success in terms of its de-
radicalization efforts, with a score of 8 out of 16.205 Perhaps the “Yemeni Government’s 
lack of financial resources,” as well as its failure to “provide adequate after-care for 
released detainees” can help to explain how the country’s de-radicalization program has 
not been a success.206 Without the financial capacity, for example, the Yemeni 
202 Ibid, 21. Although the MB has recently sided with the policies of the Jordanian regime, there are also 
more radical elements within the MB, and siding with the regime by the moderate forces within the MB 
may have further aggravated the radicalized forces within the movement. 
203 Yair Minzili, “The Jordanian Regime Fights the War of Ideas,” Current trends in Islamist ideology 5 
(2007): 66. 
204 Ibid, 67. 
205 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression. As the mean freedom score for Yemen 
from 2002 to 2005 is 5.4, I characterize the country as “not free” since “not free” ranges from 5.5 to 7. See 
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world-2014/methodology (accessed March 10, 2015). 
206 Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Laura O. Khor, “Detainee Release and Global Public Safety: 
Terrorist Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs—The Way Ahead,” Homeland Security Policy 
Institute HSPI Issue Brief Series 22 (June 2014): 7.  
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Government could not stand up a formal system to help ensure that detainees do not 
return to terrorism, such as through regular payments to former detainees, employment 
help, and psychological and material assistance to detainees’ families.  
          Also, repression backfired, as rights abuses inflamed the detainees: “For the 
participating detainees, and for many observers, it was this image of the laws being 
sidelined that was the most remarkable aspect of the dialogue project and which 
overshadowed the aspects of religious debates.”207 In addition to not being “informed 
about their legal rights” and being counselled by Yemeni officials to not seek legal 
representation, detainees suffered “beatings with electric wires,” and “receiv[ed] threats 
that their female family members would be arrested if they did not confess to the 
accusations made against them.”208 Instead of aiding the de-radicalization process, 
repression by the Yemeni Government only fomented the detainees further, leading to the 
program’s eventual demise.                
  
          Alternative Explanations for Success of De-radicalization Programs  
         It appears that state repression alone may not be able to explain why some 
countries’ programs are more successful than others at combating Islamist extremism and 
terrorism.209 Other factors, including dynamic leadership by terrorist or extremist group 
leaders, may foster successful de-radicalization, as a charismatic leader can more easily 
sway group members into believing that extremism is not the answer.210 With charismatic 
207 Ane Skov Birk, “Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in 
Yemen,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Developments in 
Radicalisation and Political Violence (April 2009): 12-15. 
208 Ibid, 11-12.  
209 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 14. 
210 Ibid, 138. 
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leadership, group members are less likely to continue to support extremism, because 
“doing so would involve opposing their social network.”211  
          In Algeria’s case, although the country’s freedom rating is 5.5 or “not free,” and its 
de-radicalization success ranking is 12 points out of 16, charismatic leadership may 
further illustrate why the country’s de-radicalization efforts were successful.212 In 
contrast to the GIA, the de-radicalization of the AIS was successful because of 
charismatic leadership within the group that encouraged members to abandon terrorism 
and extremism.213 Perhaps because the ultimate call to end violence came from the top, 
AIS operatives were convinced that continuing violence was not in their individual best 
interest, as it was not in the best interest of the group as a whole.214 
          In addition to dynamic leadership in extremist and terrorist groups, another factor 
that may help explain the success of de-radicalization is selective inducements.215 
Although both state repression and charismatic leadership were present in the de-
radicalization of the AIS, selective inducements proved to be another important factor in 
the group’s de-radicalization.216 ‘Carrots’ not only “attract the attention of the members 
of armed organizations after periods of repression,” but also lend greater credibility to the 
organization’s leaders who advocate for de-radicalization over those who do not.217     
211 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, 167. 
212 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression. 
213 Omar Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures,” Middle East Institute 
Policy Brief 21 (2008): 2. 
214 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 122. 
215 Ibid, 125-127. 
216 Omar Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: The Case of the Islamic Salvation Army and 
Affiliated Militias,” in Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation, ed. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene 
Anne R. Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin (New York: Routledge, 2011), 19-20. 
217 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 140. 
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           One way that the Algerian Government incentivized AIS members was through 
employment assistance, resulting in several AIS leaders finding work as “successful 
business entrepreneurs.”218 The Algerian Government also released political prisoners, as 
one of the AIS’ main demands was the release of all of its detainees. As a result of the 
prisoner release, the de-radicalization process was strengthened, as more militants were 
willing to moderate their extremist behavior.219 The role of selective inducements can 
also be seen in the IG’s de-radicalization in Egypt, as the Egyptian government permitted 
IG members to participate in religious study together in prison, and prisoners could 
engage in debate on Islamic interpretation. By keeping the IG cohesive, the government 
was better able to facilitate the moderation of extremist ideology within the group, and 
drive support for the initiative to end violence.220 
 
          Conclusion 
         As the findings of this study illustrate, although as state repression increases, the 
success of de-radicalization programs increases, there is not a strong relationship. Other 
variables, such as charismatic leadership within Islamist extremist and Islamist terrorist 
groups, as well as selective inducements provided by the state to encourage such groups 
to abandon terrorism and extremism may also contribute to the success of de-
radicalization.  
218 Omar Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: The Case of the Islamic Salvation Army and 
Affiliated Militias,” 19. 
219 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 126. 
220 Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin, “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting 
Militant Islam in Egypt,” 473. 
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         In future research, I could explore in more depth the alternative explanations that 
may account for change in the dependent variable, including dynamic leadership within 
Islamist extremist and Islamist terrorist groups and selective inducements. I could include 
these other two explanations as control variables, to examine the degree to which they 
interact with state repression, and affect de-radicalization success. As Algeria, for 
example, illustrates evidence of state repression, charismatic leadership, and incentives as 
part of its efforts to de-radicalize the AIS, I can use data to quantitatively test if together, 
these variables yield a statistically significant relationship to de-radicalization success.  
         This study makes an important contribution to the practice of counterterrorism, as 
policymakers can gauge the extent to which state repression does or does not make de-
radicalization more successful. As my results show, state repression may not play a major 
role in making de-radicalization more successful, at least in isolation, as dynamic 
leadership within extremist or terrorist groups and incentives for group members to de-
radicalize are also important.  
          As this study illustrates that government repression may only further fuel Islamist 
extremism and Islamist terrorism, these same repressive tactics failed to quiet pro-
democracy protesters in the wake of the Arab Spring.221 Despite beatings, detentions, and 
other forms of repression by Egyptian authorities, the protests became progressively 
larger, and interestingly, “the Islamist movement joined the protests.”222 Thus, state 
repression, instead of wearing down the resolve of those who are being repressed, may 
only make pro-democracy protesters demonstrate with greater vigor, and may only make 
221 Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, “To Repress or Not to Repress — Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab 
Spring, Terrorism and Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 0 (2014): 11-12. 
222 Ibid, 11. 
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Islamist terrorists fight harder. As Islamist terrorism and Islamist extremism continues to 
be a major issue, especially in Muslim-majority countries, it will be interesting to observe 
whether the presence of state repression drives Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists 
to de-radicalize to avoid continued subjugation, or if state repression will prove to be a 






































Chapter 3. You can Have it Both Ways: How a State’s Religious Characteristics 
Affect Whether States Focus on Religious Re-education or Social Re-integration 
Approaches to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists 
 
         Most states with de-radicalization programs for Islamist extremists and Islamist 
terrorists apply a combination of methods to re-integrate these individuals back into 
mainstream society, including social initiatives such as vocational training, help finding 
employment, financial assistance, and mental health counselling; as well as religious 
initiatives to help extremists moderate their radical interpretation of Islam. While some 
countries place particular emphasis on social re-integration rather than religious re-
education or vice versa, other countries place relatively equal weight on both approaches. 
          This chapter investigates whether states with a greater percent of Muslims per total 
population tend to place more importance on a religious re-education approach to de-
radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, versus an approach aimed at social 
re-integration. I posit that states with a greater percentage of Muslims will tend to focus 
on religious re-education, as since Muslims are not the minority in these states, 
authorities will not view social integration as being the primary catalyst for extremism.  
          Second, I hypothesize that states with an official religion will tend to place more 
importance on religious re-education, as the lack of any church-state separation can give 
the state greater justification for trying to reform individuals’ religious views. Also, I 
believe that governments, and the religious organizations they sponsor, will have more 
credibility among the religious population in religious states than in secular states.    
         Thirdly, I posit that states with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority 
religion who do not follow the state’s religious interpretation will tend to emphasize a 
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religious re-education approach, as the state may view any alternative interpretations as a 
threat to its authority.    
           I study 8 countries chosen at random from a total of 16 countries that have de-
radicalization programs meant to combat Islamist extremism and terrorism. The countries 
that I randomly selected are Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, the US (in Iraq), Yemen, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Denmark.223 My research uses data on the percent of Muslims per 
total population of each country; the presence or absence of official religion; and the level 
of government constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not comply with 
the religion interpretation that the state endorses. To determine the extent to which the 8 
countries apply religious and social approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and 
Islamist terrorists, I rely on case studies of each country’s programs, from books, 
scholarly journal articles, news articles, and government reports.  
          The findings reveal that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population 
a country has the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-
education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization 
efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of 
the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less 
likely to focus on religious re-education. However, the relationships are not strong. I then 
explore whether alternative explanations, including a state’s social welfare spending, 
compulsory learning in the majority religion, and constraints on formal religious 
organizations that are not political parties affect a state’s approach to de-radicalization.  
223 I include Morocco in this chapter because although it may be difficult to assess the success of the 
country’s de-radicalization efforts, since they were just initiated in 2011, there is enough information for 




                                                 
                   
          The Religious Nature of States and Different Approaches to De-Radicalizing    
          Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists: Social Versus Religious Perspectives   
          Different countries will often emphasize either religious or social approaches to de-
radicalization, depending on the regional context.224 In contrast to de-radicalization 
programs in “South East Asian and Middle Eastern” countries, European programs 
traditionally concentrate on social initiatives including “practical and economic 
assistance” and “psychological counseling,” rather than religious ideology.225  
          While “Egypt was the first Islamic country to experiment with a dialogue program 
for imprisoned Muslim extremists,” every de-radicalization program is based on the 
common principle that “a shortage of social capital needs to be addressed.”226 Egyptian 
authorities acknowledged the need for social development by facilitating the issuing of 
pensions to IG prisoners upon their release from detention.227 Many de-radicalization 
programs also have other characteristics in common, including using friends, family 
members, or “repentant terrorists” as “go-between[s] who can influence the terrorist [or 
extremist],” and relying on friends and family members to encourage terrorists or 
extremists to stay on track through their de-radicalization process.228 
           
224 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, 122. See also Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and 
Approaches,” 100. 
225Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches,” 100. 
226 Frank Bovenkerk, “On leaving criminal organizations,” Crime, Law and Social Change 55 (2011): 272. 
227 Peter R. Neumann, “Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries,”  
44. While the IG managed the issuing of pensions to former prisoners, it is highly likely that the Egyptian 
Government helped provide either indirect or direct funding for these pensions. 
228 Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari, “Deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious 
terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world: an overview,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and 
collective disengagement, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (London: Routledge, 2009), 173-174. 
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            Religious Education and Radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist 
          Terrorists 
          While Muslim-dominated countries may have a vested interest in ensuring that 
Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists adopt a non-radical form of Islam, European 
countries tend to place less emphasis on encouraging Islamist extremists or Islamist 
terrorists to amend their violent view of the religion: “European approaches are shaped 
by the fact that Muslims are a minority in secular, nominally Christian-majority 
countries. As a consequence, European governments recognize that they cannot directly 
challenge an ideology based on Islam.”229 Although Islamist radicalization is a growing 
concern in secular countries such as the Netherlands, the “division between church and 
state” precludes the government from taking part in conversations regarding moderate 
versus extremist Muslim views.230   
          Furthermore, in secular states, leaders may have little leverage in reforming 
Islamist extremists’ mindset, as “limited capability and credibility constrain authorities’ 
ability to influence ideology.”231 Malaysian leaders, for example, may be able to sway 
militants by re-assuring them that Malaysia is an Islamic state and that “sharia law is 
gradually becoming parallel to the secular legal system.”232 However, with respect to the 
UK’s Prevent program and similar radicalization prevention efforts by the US, Rascoff 
229 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist 
Extremists, 39. 
230 Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant, Marieke Slootman, and Jean Tillie, “Decline and Disengagement: An 
Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation,” Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies (IMES), IMES Reports 
Series (2008): 10. 
231 Marisa L. Porges and Jessica Stern, “Getting Deradicalization Right,” Foreign Affairs (published 
May/June 2010) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66227/marisa-l-porges-jessica-stern/getting-
deradicalization-right (accessed February 16, 2015). 
232 Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” 152. One of Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI)’s central goals is to establish an Islamic state. 
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(2012) suggests that “the government lacks credibility within Muslim communities and 
lacks expertise regarding the relevant religious issues.”233 He proposes that the 
“legitimacy gap” may be greatest in Western countries, as Muslims may not take 
seriously or refuse to cooperate with religious organizations—“however ‘radical’” they 
are—if they are sponsored by a secular government.234 
          Despite these concerns, the Solas Foundation program in Scotland, which seeks to 
prevent radicalization through “formal Islamic education,” has received accolades from 
past participants.235 Run by respected Muslim scholars who “were born and educated in 
Scotland” and “studied in the Muslim world with some of its leading theologians,” they 
‘understand the needs of the community.’236 Despite being a secular country, Scotland 
has been able to make its de-radicalization program relevant by involving credible 
religious figures who are able to relate to European Muslims’ theological struggles. 
          While Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia may employ a combination of social, 
‘religious, psychological, and cultural’ initiatives, participants are “engaged all the while 
in a program consolidating the ‘correct notions and concepts’ of Islam.”237 As Saudi 
Arabia is primarily concerned with “regime security,” it has tried to avert the influence of 
Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism in the region by giving “Egypt $4 billion to 
shore up the fledgling post-Mubarak order, and to prevent its further radicalization.”238 In 
233 Samuel J. Rascoff, “Establishing Official Islam? The law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization,” 
Stanford Law Review 64 (January 2012): 163-167. 
234 Ibid, 167. 
235 Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, “Tackling Muslim Radicalization: Lessons from 
Scotland,” (June 2010): 1. 
236 Ibid, 4-10. The quote here is taken from a testimonial of one of the program’s participants. 
237 Ellie Hearne and Nur Laiq, “A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism,” 7. 
238 Mehran Kamrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi Led Counterrevolution,” Orbis 56 (2012): 97-99. 
Saudi Arabia also continues to monitor the volatile political situation in Yemen, especially given Saudi 
Arabia’s concern over AQAP.  
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Uzbekistan, which purports to be a secular country, the government limits “the exercise 
of Islam to a single state-supported form.”239 President Islam Karimov, convinced that 
“radical Islamists and fundamentalists threaten to destabilize the state,” has suppressed 
“leaders of radical Islamic groups which openly criticized official Muslim administration 
or did not demonstrate explicit loyalty to the state.”240 Fearful that more radical Islamist 
groups may try to subvert the existing religious-political order, the Karimov regime has 
blamed “the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir, in all incidents of political violence in 
Uzbekistan.”241 Evidently, the Government of Uzbekistan wants to ensure that its own 
brand of Islam is not subsumed by a more fundamentalist strand.    
          One of the justifications for Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization program is that 
“certain mosques remain sources of radicalism,” urging mosques to “promote moderate 
Islam.”242 Furthermore, worrying that teachers might “radicalize their students,” the 
Saudi Arabian Government “removed approximately 200 [teachers] to administrative 
positions.”243 Mosques have also been a source of radicalization in non-Muslim-majority 
countries, as Dzokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended a radical Boston mosque that 
promoted “a narrative of Muslims around the world being under attack alongside a duty 
to aide them.”244 In response, moderate imams in US mosques are using the internet to 
239 Ani Sarkissian, “Religious Regulation and the Muslim Democracy Gap,” Politics and Religion 5 (2012): 
520. See Zabikhulla S. Saipov, Eurasia Review, “Uzbekistan Seeks to Reinvigorate Diplomatic Clout in 
Region – Analysis,” (published December 17, 2014)  http://www.eurasiareview.com/17122014-uzbekistan-
seeks-reinvigorate-diplomatic-clout-region-analysis/ (accessed February 24, 2015). Uzbekistan is described 
as a secular country.  
240 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States’ 
Responses to Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 377. 
241 Ibid. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a violent Islamist extremist organization operating 
in Central Asia. The author describes Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) as an “extremist Islamic political organization.” 
(See 371-373, 376). 
242 Ellie Hearne and Nur Laiq, “A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism,” 8. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Anne Speckhard, “The Boston Marathon Bombers: the Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to 
Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (June 2013): 70-71. 
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engage Muslims, based on the notion that fostering a sense of community can inoculate 
Muslims from extremism.245 Whereas Saudi Arabia sees radical Islamism as a threat to 
its stability, enforcing measures such as firing teachers to ensure that its influence does 
not spread, US efforts to combat Islamist extremism are more suggestive in nature, as 
radical Islamism is not perceived as a threat to the existing political administration.   
          Other secular countries, including Tajikistan, fear radical Muslim influences in the 
political realm, as the “Tajik government continues to view Islamism as one of the main 
threats to national security.”246 As “public infrastructure has continued to deteriorate” in 
Central Asian countries since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Tajikistan views the 
“growth of Islamic communities and charities” that provide social services as a “political 
threat.”247 Similar to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan associates any government opposition with 
radicalism, and “assume[s] that any regime opponents are connected to the IMU.”248  
          In terms of its youth counter-radicalization efforts, whereas Uzbekistan’s program 
centers on “creat[ing] a youth base that is loyal to the regime and inculcated with the 
mainstream values of the official state ideology,” Tajikistan’s program is concerned more 
with “extra-curricular, skill-based development opportunities” for “disenfranchised 
youth.”249 Additionally, while in Uzbekistan, young people are “constantly monitored so 
245 Peter Chalk, Todd C. Helmus, and Erin York, “Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent 
Extremism,” RAND Corporation (2013): 6. 
246 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States’ 
Responses to Terror,” 379. 
247 Kara Downey, Washington Post, “Why secular but illiberal governments are no guarantee of religious 
freedom,” (published February 28, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/02/28/religious-repression-in-central-asia-secular-but-illiberal-governments-are-no-
guarantee-of-religious-freedom/ (accessed February 22, 2015). 
248 Ibid. 
249 Farhod Yuldashev, “Countering Terrorism in Ferghana Valley: A Comparative Analysis of Uzbek, 
Kyrgyz, and Tajik Youth Policies as a Measure of Success,” in Counter Terrorism in Diverse Communities, 
ed. Sıddık Ekici (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011), 297-298. Uzbekistan’s state ideology that is described here 
is more political and cultural than religious in nature, and is tied to the post-Soviet youth organization 
called Kamolot. The Government of Turkmenistan has a similar position, as both governments indoctrinate 
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that they don’t join radical groups and terrorist organizations,” Tajikistan is more hands-
off in this regard, focusing more on improving social integration than on ideological 
indoctrination.250  
           Despite some countries’ efforts to moderate the Islamist extremist ideology, 
Borum (2011) suggests that ‘moderate Islam’ may be false, as ‘no school of Islamic 
jurisprudence [exists] that does not teach the necessity to work toward the political 
dominance of Islamic law and the subjugation of unbelievers under that law.’251 In other 
words, it may not be possible to moderate Islamist extremism if there is no moderate 
form of Islam to base de-radicalization on. Likewise, the absence of a “central power 
structure” from Islam may challenge the “ability of Islamists to demonstrate their 
commitment to embracing moderation.”252 Furthermore, “moderation may have little to 
do with religion and everything to do with historical power struggles and local contexts,” 
as “religious authority” is more about protecting a regime from being taken over by more 
radical elements.253 Regardless, many countries continue to incorporate the moderation of 
religious ideology, especially through religious dialogue, into their de-radicalization 
efforts. 
           
           
their youth into the country’s political and cultural ideology by teaching only government-approved 
material. See Gulnoza Saidazimova, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Central Asia: Youth Have Few 
Options In Uzbekistan; Even Fewer In Turkmenistan,” (published April 11, 2005) 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058382.html (accessed February 26, 2015). 
250 Farhod Yuldashev, “Countering Terrorism in Ferghana Valley: A Comparative Analysis of Uzbek, 
Kyrgyz, and Tajik Youth Policies as a Measure of Success,” 298. 
251 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories.” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4 (Winter 2011): 11.  
252 Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation 
Hypothesis,” World Politics 63 (2011): 354. 
253 Ibid, 354-355. 
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          Social Integration and Radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists 
          From the standpoint of social integration, individuals who are better assimilated 
into society are not very susceptible to becoming radicalized, while individuals who are 
not as well assimilated are more susceptible.254 The “exclusion perspective,” which the 
European Union (EU) promotes, “links terrorism to social exclusion, unemployment, a 
lack of integration, a breakdown in common values, the dissolution of civil society and 
also the war on terror itself.”255 According to Neumann (2006), “second- or third-
generation Muslim immigrants” living in Europe are more vulnerable to becoming 
radicalized, because they feel conflicted by “the traditional values of their parents (which 
they often resent) and the demands and promise of Western society (which they find hard 
to access).”256  
          Muslim immigrants frequently fail to identify with their adopted European culture 
as Western values of capitalism, materialism, and hedonism may be complete anathema 
to the socially and religiously conservative culture they are accustomed to. As Denmark 
identifies radicalization as resulting in part from “inadequate social integration,” its de-
radicalization program seeks to “find constructive social alternatives to extremist groups” 
by, for example, ensuring that extremists have the necessary encouragement from 
“families and social networks” to successfully abandon their extremist ties.257  
254 Janne Flyghed and Magnus Hörnqvist, “Exclusion or culture? The rise and the ambiguity of the 
radicalisation debate,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 5 (December 2012): 328. 
255 Ibid, 327. 
256 Peter R. Neumann, “Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma,” Survival 48 (Summer 2006): 73. 
257 Riazat Butt and Henry Tuck, “European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative 
Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany,” Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue (2014): 16-18. 
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          One debate surrounding social explanations for radicalization concerns whether 
unemployment is important to radicalization.258 Regarding AQAP members, 
Hegghammer (2006) argues that “socioeconomic” considerations such as unemployment 
do not tell the whole story, as although a large number of AQAP members did not hold 
jobs, of those who did, “very few were significantly overqualified.”259 As such, there are 
“fewer reasons to believe that unfulfilled ambitions or a sense of relative deprivation 
fueled their social alienation.”260  
          In contrast, Al-Hashimi and Goerzig (2015) cite unemployment as a factor in 
violent riots that occurred in 2005 in Muslim neighborhoods outside of Paris, as a lack of 
“prospects for upward social mobility” fomented Muslims to take a stand against the 
French Government.261 Although the riots were initially spurred by “police brutality,” 
Muslims used the protests to call attention to the ‘racial and social’ prejudice by French 
authorities that precluded many Muslims from finding jobs.262           
          Alternatively, Staun and Veldhuis (2009) contend that “many radical Muslims” are 
“well integrated and indistinguishable from the general population,” and are “born and 
raised in the relative prosperity and freedom of a modern, democratic country.”263 The 
258 Erik van de Linde and Patrick van der Duin, “The Delphi method as early warning: Linking global 
societal trends to future radicalization and terrorism in the Netherlands,” Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change 78 (2011): 1562. 
259 Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 
13 (Winter 2006): 45. The author also found that only a small number of AQAP members had a criminal 
history prior to their radicalization. 
260 Ibid. The author finds that AQAP members have a common history of terrorism involvement, acquired 
mostly during time spent fighting in Afghanistan.  
261 Khaled Al-Hashimi and Carolin Goerzig, Radicalization in Western Europe: Integration, public 
discourse, and loss of identity among Muslim communities, (London: Routledge, 2015), 106-107. 
262 Ibid. Discriminatory comments against Parisian Muslims by President Sarkozy, as well as the 
recommendation by Sarkozy that the French Government monitor the funding of Muslim religious 
institutions also contributed to the grievances that played out in the 2005 protests. 
263 Jørgen Staun and Tinka Veldhuis, “Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model,” The Hague, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (October 2009): 8. 
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main operative in the London subway bomb attack in July 2005, Mohammad Siddique 
Khan, cited the UK’s anti-Muslim “foreign policy,” especially in Iraq, as a key catalyst 
for his radicalization and subsequent pursuit of terrorism.264 Likewise, Shehzad Tanweer, 
an associate, claimed that the attack was not inspired by ‘poverty, unemployment and 
emptiness as some of the mercenary media try to portray it to us.’265           
          Further exploring the relationship between socioeconomic influences and 
terrorism, Stern (2010) asserts that although “there is no direct correlation between low 
GDP and terrorism,” impoverished individuals “in countries with high levels of 
unemployment” are at greater risk of being recruited into terrorism.266 In Saudi Arabia, 
the majority of participants in the country’s de-radicalization program “are men in their 
20s from large lower- or middle-class families.”267 By setting up vocational “training 
courses,” Saudi Arabia hopes to “qualify [released detainees’] for better, more 
substantive, employment upon their release than they previously had.”268  
          Within democracies, and specifically within the EU, the literature describes how 
societies that promote multiculturalism versus those that promote assimilation treat 
Islamist radicalization.269 The UK and US execute the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or multicultural 
approach, as they actively promote freedom of speech and believe that democracies 
264 Stephen Vertigans, “Routes into ‘Islamic’ Terrorism: Dead Ends and Spaghetti Junctions,” Policing 1 
(2007): 455. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Jessica Stern, “Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists,” Foreign Affairs 89 (2010): 
100. 
267 Ibid, 101. 
268 Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Aftercare,” Carnegie Papers Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Program 97 
(September 2008): 20. 
269 Alejandro J. Beutel, “Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: 
Lessons Learned for America,” Minaret of Freedom Institute (August 2007): 2.  
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should “tolerate a degree of extremism.”270 While Neumann (2013)271 describes the role 
of police officers in the UK as mainly to stop crime, Davies and Spalek (2012) see law 
enforcement there as having a stake in “the ideologies circulating within communities, 
particularly where those ideologies endorse violence.”272    
          Another point of contention in the literature concerns whether law enforcement 
treat Muslims in Western democracies as part of a ‘suspect community,’ pursuing 
security measures that stigmatize a country’s Muslims.273 The stigmatization of Salafis 
and Islamists by authorities has jeopardized UK law enforcement’s ability to fight Al 
Qaeda’s hateful message, as the more conservative Salafis and Islamists are generally 
better attuned to signs of Al Qaeda-inspired behavior than their more moderate Sufi 
counterparts.274 Challenging this “distinct communities” concept, Ragazzi (2014) 
contends that “counter-radicalization policies” actively seek to “manage” diversity 
through ‘policed multiculturalism.’275 The “management of diversity” can be seen in the 
UK and US’ ‘stakeholder approach’ to counterterrorism, where citizens are encouraged to 
‘self-regulate’ by ‘report[ing] suspicious activity.’276 ‘Policed multiculturalism’ seeks to 
make minorities feel empowered as equals in combating terrorism, as opposed to bearing 
the brunt of “repressive measures.”277  
270 Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble With Radicalization.” International Affairs 89 (July 2013): 886. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Lynn Davies and Basia Spalek. “Mentoring in Relation to Violent Extremism: A Study of Role, 
Purpose, and Outcomes.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35 (2012): 361-362. Neighborhood policing is 
also known as community policing.  
273 Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ Suspect Community Examining 
the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation,” British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009): 646. 
274 Ibid, 659-660. Recently, the UK Government has engaged with the more moderate Sufis in an attempt to 
counter Islamist extremism. 
275 Francesco Ragazzi, “Policed multiculturalism? The impact of counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalization and the ‘end’ of multiculturalism,” in Counter-Radicalisation Critical Perspectives, eds. 
Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis ( London: Routledge, 2014), 162-163. 
276 Ibid, 166-167. 
277 Ibid, 162-164. 
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          On “managing diversity,” Moghaddam (2012) argues that both multiculturalism 
and assimilation threaten “collective identity,” often leading to ‘defensive’ actions 
including “radicalization and terrorism.”278 Omniculturalism, alternatively, can address 
“the challenge of threatened collective identities,” as its “universalist” view banishes 
group differences.279 As Moghaddam (2012) perceives radicalization to be a “group 
defense mechanism,” omniculturalism can address this inter-group alienation that leads 
individuals to radicalize.280 In Britain, multicultural policies have served to marginalize 
minority groups such as Muslims, breeding radicalization in response to the uneven 
allocation of “political power and financial resources,” for instance.281           
          Despite the existing scholarship, the questions at the heart of my research remain 
unanswered. Although the connections among a state’s religious nature—including its 
religious makeup and posture vis-à-vis Islamist extremism—and de-radicalization 
programs have been the focus of recent scholarship, factors affecting what specific de-
radicalization approaches states choose to pursue has not been systematically measured. 
This chapter will shed light on the range of approaches that countries use to de-radicalize 
Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, and will hopefully help policymakers who are 
considering or actively developing de-radicalization programs in their own countries to 
determine the mix of religious and social approaches that they would like to implement.  
 
           
278 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The omnicultural imperative.” Culture and Psychology 18 (2012): 310. 
279 Ibid, 320-322. 
280 Ibid, 319. 
281 Kenan Malik, New York Times, “Assimilation’s Failure, Terrorism’s Rise,” (published July 6, 2011) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/opinion/07malik.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed November 
15, 2014). See Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The omnicultural imperative,” 316. 
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          Data and Methods 
         This study includes a representative sample of countries that have government-led 
or government facilitated de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and 
Islamist terrorists, including Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, the United States (in 
Iraq), Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, and Denmark.282 I selected the countries based on a 
random drawing, where I chose an even number of countries from 4 different 
geographical regions representing different religious contexts: Middle East and South 
Asia; Southeast Asia; North Africa; and Europe.283 I use quantitative analysis to 
determine the effect of percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and 
restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific 
religious interpretation that the state endorses.  
         For the dependent variable, I examine the literature to determine whether states 
emphasize either religious or social approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and 
Islamist terrorists, or if states feature aspects of each approach relatively equally. I 
measure the independent variables using country-level data on percent of the population 
that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion 
who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses. To 
determine a relationship between the independent and dependent variables I use scatter 
plots. 
           
             
282 The 8 countries that I did not select are: Germany, the Netherlands, Thailand, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, 
Israel, and Pakistan. 




                                                 
          Hypotheses 
a.) States with a greater percentage of Muslims will focus their efforts to de-
radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists more on religious re-
education rather than social re-integration. 
 
b.) States with an official religion will focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist 
extremists and Islamist terrorists more on religious re-education rather than social 
re-integration. 
 
c.) States with greater constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not 
agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses will focus their 
efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists more on 
religious re-education rather than social re-integration. 
          
          Unit of Analysis 
         I will examine how countries with de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist 
extremists and Islamist terrorists behave in response to the percent of the population that 
is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do 
not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses.   
          





          Dependent Variable: State De-radicalization Programs Aimed at Islamist  
          Extremists and Islamist Terrorists 
         The dependent variable is state de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist 
extremists and Islamist terrorists. To operationalize this variable, I examine case studies 
to determine which countries emphasize religious re-education versus social re-
integration to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Table 5 illustrates 
the aspects of each country’s approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist 
terrorists based on the literature.284  
          Although no existing study explicitly lays out different countries’ de-radicalization 
efforts according to religious versus social approaches, El-Said and Harrigan (2011) 
examine the counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs of 37 UN member 
states, in which all 37 countries were invited to “provide information on their non-
coercive policies and initiatives designed to address radicalisation and extremism that 
lead to terrorism.”285 The UN then organized aspects of each state’s efforts by category, 
including “rehabilitation,” “engaging civil society,” and addressing “economic-social 
inequalities.”286  
          Similarly, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2010) uses a table to outline 
various European and North American countries’ de-radicalization efforts according to 
“factors in radicalization”: divisions, grievances, narratives, and means.287 To address 
284 See Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists. 
285 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 238. Muslim-majority 
and non-Muslim-majority countries participated, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Russia, 
Iceland, and others. 
286 Ibid, 239-240. 
287 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalisation,” 4. 
PPN in this publication refers to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s “Policy Planners’ Network on 
Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation.” Comprised of the “UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Spain and Canada,” the PPN serves as a forum for 
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grievances, and specifically to “improve labour market outcomes,” the ISD indicates that 
certain PPN countries have made promoting “professional networks” and “training and 
employment projects” part of their de-radicalization programs.288  
          Similarly, the UK Home Office (2011) describes different countries’ de-
radicalization programs, using a table to denote such categories as country and program 
title, what groups the program is directed at, “activities and techniques,” as well as 
“measures of success.”289 Rather than explicitly categorizing de-radicalization programs 
by their religious versus social aspects as I do in Table 5, the Home Office records de-
radicalization initiatives in list form, such as “education focused on moderation” and 
“dialogue with leaders” for Egypt.290   
Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists 
 RELIGIOUS RE-EDUCATION VS. SOCIAL RE-INTEGRATION STATES 
2 Program Based Primarily on Religious Re-education 
• Emphasizes any of the following: religious dialogue; religious counselling; religious 
instruction; counter-ideological approach; correcting aberrant interpretations of Islam; 
relationship between the state and Islam; role of Muslim leadership; definition of 
jihad; discussing appropriateness of fatwas 
• Few mentions of initiatives aimed at social re-integration 
YEM, SIN, 
MAL, EGY 
1.5 Relatively Equal Weight Given to Both Approaches 
• Religious re-education and social re-integration are both central to de-radicalization 
USA (in 
Iraq), MOR 
1 Program Based Primarily on Social Re-integration 
• Emphasizes any of the following: finding social alternatives to extremism; 
employment for former militants and/or their families; restoring former militants’ 
previously held jobs; loans and/or grants to encourage entrepreneurship; vocational 
training; continuing education; psychological counselling for former militants and/or 
their families and/or mentorship; support groups; financial assistance (e.g., tuition 
assistance, incentives for rejecting violence, compensation to families of former 
militants); obtaining housing; organized sports and/or other organized recreation; 
pardons or decreased jail time for former extremists 
• Few mentions of initiatives aimed at religious re-education 
DEN, AFG 
AFG=Afghanistan, DEN=Denmark, EGY=Egypt, MAL=Malaysia, MOR=Morocco, SIN=Singapore, YEM=Yemen. 
Sources: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014, El-Said 2012, El-
Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Harrigan 2013, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research 2010, Mekhennet 2011, Ramakrishna 2014, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
exchanging information on countering radicalization to gauge, for example, what initiatives have proven to 
be successful in the concerned countries. See Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Policy Planners’ Network,” 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/programmes/counter-extremism/ppn (accessed February 28, 2015). 
288 Ibid, 5. ISD’s table does not specify which countries have pursued which initiatives. 
289 Emma Disley et al., UK Home Office, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, “Individual 
disengagement from Al-Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy 
and practice in preventing terrorism,” Occasional Paper 99 (November 2011): 108-112. 
290 Ibid, 110. See Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists. 
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           Independent Variables: Percent of the Population that is Muslim; Official  
         Religion; Restrictions on Adherents of the Majority Religion who do not Agree With  
        the Religious Interpretation that the State Endorses 
         To test my first hypothesis, I use the percent of the country’s total population that is 
Muslim for the independent variable. To operationalize this variable, I measure each 
country’s percent of Muslims per total population against the dependent variable, to 
gauge the extent to which percentage of Muslims affects whether a state pursues an 
approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists that emphasizes religious re-education or 
social re-integration, or if a state focuses on each relatively equally. For each country, I 
collect data from Pew Research Center on the percentage of Muslims from 2010.291 The 
percent of Muslims per total population is an appropriate measure, as being that Muslim 
immigrants are minorities in Western countries, especially in Europe, they often have 
difficulty integrating into a society that may be at odds with the traditional, religiously 
conservative values they are used to.292   
          For the second hypothesis, I use each country’s presence or absence of official 
religion as the independent variable. To operationalize this variable, I measure official 
religion against the dependent variable, to gauge the extent to which the independent 
variable affects whether a state focuses de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and 
Islamist terrorists on religious re-education or social re-integration, or if a state focuses 
291 Pew Research Center, “Table: Muslim Population by Country,” (published January 27, 2011) 
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/ (accessed February 28, 2015). 
2010 is the most recent year that Pew supplies data for this measure. Pew measures this data every 20 
years. From 1990 to 2010, Malaysia was the only country in my sample to have experienced a significant 
population increase (approximately ten million from 1990 to 2010). This may help to explain the increase 
in the country’s Muslims from 49 percent in 1990 to 61.4 percent in 2010. See World Bank, “Population, 
total,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=4 (accessed February 28, 2015). 
292 Peter R. Neumann, “Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma,” 73. 
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on each relatively equally. I take the mean score for official religion from the Religion 
and State Project for the core years of each country’s de-radicalization program, 1 being 
no official religion, and 3 indicating that the state has one official religion.293 According 
to Fox (2011), a religion is official when a state specifies a particular religious affiliation 
in its constitution.294 The presence or absence of official religion is an appropriate 
measure, as Rascoff (2012) contends that Muslims in Western countries may not be as 
apt to cooperate with the country’s religious organizations if they are backed by a secular 
government.295  
          To further evaluate how a state’s religious nature impacts a country’s mix of 
approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, I measure a 
state’s restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the 
religious interpretation that the state endorses, for my third hypothesis. To operationalize 
this variable, I measure the extent to which “the government restricts or harasses 
members and organizations affiliated with the majority religion but who operate outside 
of the state sponsored or recognized ecclesiastical framework” against the dependent 
variable, to determine its effect on whether a state focuses de-radicalization of Islamist 
293 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org.  See also Association 
of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), “The Religion and State Project, Round 2,” 
http://www.thearda.com/archive/files/Codebooks/RAS2012_CB.asp (accessed February 28, 2015). I re-
coded the variable to range from 1 to 3, as the ARDA measures the variable from 0, no official religion, to 
2, one official religion. ARDA measures the variable (sax) from 1990 to 2008. The RDA has a more 
nuanced variable, Official Government Involvement in Religion (GIR), sbx, with 15 categories, but it 
would be more difficult to draw a correlation as the categories measure specific characteristics of the state’s 
relationship to official religion, e.g., “state controlled religion, positive attitude.”   
294 Jonathan Fox, “Out of Sync: The Disconnect Between Constitutional Clauses and State Legislation on 
Religion,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44 (March 2011): 59-62. 
295 Samuel J. Rascoff, “Establishing Official Islam? The law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization,” 167. 
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extremists and Islamist terrorists on religious re-education or social re-integration, or if a 
state focuses on each relatively equally.296  
          I take the mean score for this Religion and State Project measure for the core years 
that each country has operated programs to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist 
terrorists.297 While 1 indicates “no restrictions,” 4 indicates that “operat[ing] outside of 
the state sponsored or recognized ecclesiastical framework” is “illegal.”298 Furthermore, a 
score of 4 may also denote that, regarding placing limits on or harassing those who do not 
comply with the state’s religious interpretation, “the government engages in this activity 
often and on a large scale.”299  
          This measure is appropriate to my study, as in Malaysia, for example, “Muslims 
who deviate from accepted Sunni principles may be detained and subjected to mandatory 
‘rehabilitation’ in centers that teach and enforce government-approved Islamic 
practices.”300 In other words, individuals who espouse a radical ideology that the 
Malaysian Government believes threatens its own interpretation of Islam may be forced 
to undergo de-radicalization as a result.   
          The last section of my data analysis involves a table comparing 2 countries that 
have emphasized social re-integration as part of their de-radicalization efforts: 
296 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” 
297 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org.   
298 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” I re-coded the variable to range from 1 to 4, as the ARDA 
codes the variable from 0, “no restrictions,” to 3. This variable, no5x, is available for every year from 1990 
to 2008. A value of 1 (which I re-coded to 2) indicates “slight restrictions including practical restrictions or 
the government engages in this activity rarely and on a small scale,” while 2 (which I re-coded to 3) 
indicates “significant restrictions including practical restrictions or the government engages in this activity 
occasionally and on a moderate scale.” 
299 Ibid. 
300 US Department of State, “Malaysia, International Religious Freedom Report 2008,” 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108413.htm (accessed February 28, 2015). 
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Afghanistan and Denmark.301 First, a state’s degree of social welfare may help to explain 
why some countries emphasize a social approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists 
and Islamist terrorists.302 At the same time as welfare states have consistently delivered 
basic social services to citizens, including education and healthcare, states that are 
Islamic have not been as successful in doing so.303 In Muslim countries such as Pakistan, 
for example, while government-funded madrasas have long “provide[d] free education, 
shelter and food to its students,” from the 1970s on they have fueled radicalization and 
turned out terrorists to fight in Afghanistan’s war against the former Soviet Union.304 If 
Pakistan provides little social capital to its people outside of madrasas, then Pakistan, 
unlike welfare states such as Denmark, may not have the same capacity to de-radicalize 
Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists through social initiatives such as employment 
assistance, education, and mentorship. 
          To determine each country’s degree of social welfare, I use the International Food 
Policy Research Institute’s “public spending in social protection,” measuring both the 
percent share of each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the percent share of 
each country’s total expenditures.305 
          Another alternative explanation that I examine is “mandatory education in the 
majority religion.”306 Saudi Arabia, which includes religious re-education and promoting 
301 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study. 
302 Umbreen Javaid, “Religious Militant Extremism: Repercussions for Pakistan,” Journal of Political 
Studies 17 (2010): 56. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid, 55-56. 
305 International Food Policy Research Institute, “SPEED Data visualization tool: Public Spending in Social 
Protection,” http://www.ifpri.org/tools/speed (accessed March 4, 2015). This data is available through 2011 
for Denmark, but only through 2010 for Afghanistan. For Denmark, I calculated the mean score from 2009 
through 2011 for both measures. 
306 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.”  
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a right version of Islam as significant components of its de-radicalization efforts, 
constitutionally mandates that children learn Muslim values in their school curriculum.307 
Similarly, I evaluate the impact of “restrictions on formal religious organizations other 
than political parties” on states’ de-radicalization approaches.308 In Singapore, which 
emphasizes religious re-education in its de-radicalization efforts, religious organizations, 
or ‘specified societ[ies]’ must register with the government, enabling the government to 
“proscribe religious groups that are deemed to be ‘prejudicial to public peace, welfare or 
good order.’”309    
          I measure “mandatory education in the majority religion” and “restrictions on 
formal religious organizations other than political parties” using data from the Religion 
and State Project for 2008.310 A score of 0 indicates “not significantly restricted for any” and 
“no restrictions” respectively, and 3 indicates “the activity is prohibited or sharply 
restricted for most or all minorities” and “the activity is illegal or the government engages 
in this activity [of restricting formal religious organizations] often and on a large scale,” 
respectively.311                        
 
307 Jeroen Temperman, “State Neutrality in Public School Education: An Analysis of the Interplay Between 
the Neutrality Principle, the Right to Adequate Education, Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion or 
Belief, Parental Liberties, and the Position of Teachers,” Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010): 873. 
308 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.”  
309 Eugene K. B. Tan, “From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and 
Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore,” Law & Policy 31 (July 2009): 359. A ‘specified society’ is 
an organization that affiliates itself with religion. Such organizations that fail to register are considered 
illegitimate. 
310 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org. See also “The Religion 
and State Project, Round 2.” I use 2008 data because this is the last year that the data is available for, and 
because it is the closest year to when both Denmark and Afghanistan’s de-radicalization programs started 
(Denmark’s started in 2009, and the US turned over control to Afghanistan of its program in 2013). 
311 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” The mandatory education variable is mo9x, and the 
restrictions on religious organizations variable is no6x. I did not re-code these variables to 1 through 4 (as 
opposed to 0 through 3) because I do not calculate descriptive statistics for these. 
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          Data Analysis 
          I calculated descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables, 
illustrated in Table 6.312 The sample size for each variable is 8, for the 8 countries in my 
study that possess de-radicalization programs targeted at Islamist extremists and Islamist 
terrorists. The minimum for the dependent variable, de-radicalization program type, is 1, 
as Demark and Afghanistan both have de-radicalization programs that focus on social re-
integration more than religious re-education, highlighting job creation, financial 
assistance, mentorship, and other aspects of social development. Alternatively, the 
maximum for the dependent variable is 2, as Singapore, Yemen, Egypt, and Malaysia 
have de-radicalization programs that emphasize religious re-education more than social 
re-integration, focusing on religious dialogue and advisement, and other initiatives to 
moderate Islamist extremists’ radical ideology.     
          For the first independent variable, percent of a country’s total population that is 
Muslim, the US has the minimum percentage of Muslims per total population at 0.8 
percent, while 99.9 percent of Morocco’s total population is Muslim.313 For the second 
independent variable, official religion, the US and Singapore have no established 
religion, while Denmark, Malaysia, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Morocco all 
reported having 1 official religion.314  
          Regarding restrictions on adherents of the majority religion, the third independent 
variable, the US, Denmark, Singapore, and Yemen all cited no restrictions, while in 
312 See Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: State De-radicalization Approaches and State Religious 
Characteristics. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org. None of the countries 
in my study had “multiple established religions,” which the ARDA codes as 1. See “The Religion and State 
Project, Round 2.” 
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Afghanistan, the government forbids acting outside of the state-supported interpretation 
of Islam, and the government may actively constrain or intimidate those who do not 
follow the state’s religious edicts.315  
   
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: State De-radicalization Approaches and State Religious   
  Characteristics  





8 1.6 1 2 
Independent 
Variable 1 (percent 
total Muslim 
population) 
8 59.3 0.8 99.9 
Independent 
Variable 2 (official 
religion) 
 








2.1 1 4 
  Sources: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014, El-Said 2012, El- 
  Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Fox 2011, Harrigan 2013, International Centre for Political Violence and  
  Terrorism Research 2010, Mekhennet 2011, Pew Research Center 2011, Ramakrishna 2014, Special Inspector  
  General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
 
           
          Analysis of Relationships Between the Independent and Dependent Variables  
          As Figure 3 illustrates, the dependent variable, de-radicalization approaches, has a 
positive relationship with the first independent variable, percentage of Muslims per total 
country population. The greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country 
has, the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts will focus on religious re-education. 
However, the relationship between the two variables is not strong, as the correlation 
value is 0.167660484.316 
 
315 Ibid. 
316 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population. 
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           Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total  
         Population 
           Correlation= 0.167660484 
           Sources: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014,  
           El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Harrigan 2013, International Centre for 
           Political Violence and Terrorism Research 2010, Mekhennet 2011, Pew Research Center 2011,  
           Ramakrishna 2014, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
 
         One country that fits my first hypothesis well is Yemen, as Figure 3 shows that its 
de-radicalization program emphasized religious re-education, and the majority of its 
population is Muslim, at 99 percent.317 Under Yemen’s 2002 to 2005 “Committee for 
Religious Dialogue,” Hamoud Abdulhameed Al-Hitar, a judge and Yemeni Government 
Minister, engaged detainees in “religious dialogue” on the basis that “every act of 
terrorist activity is borne out of a distorted ideology.”318 Through discussions with Al-
Hitar and other Muslim clerics, detainees cast aside their previously held criticisms of the 
state’s interpretation of Islam in favor of a more moderate stance. In response to the 
317 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population. 
318 International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, “Combating Terrorism in Yemen 
Through the Committee for Religious Dialogue: ICPVTR Visit to Yemen,” (July 2010): 4-5. Yemen’s 
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detainees’ contention that members of the Yemeni Government were not selected by 
respected educators, politicians, or other well-revered individuals, the Committee 
clarified that the country’s policy of allowing citizens to vote for their leadership was 
indeed in accordance with Shari’a law.319 As a result of the dialogue, detainees 
“conceded that the political system in Yemen does follow the Shariah” by allowing its 
citizens to have a stake in determining who runs the country.320  
          In contrast to Yemen, Singapore does not fit the first hypothesis well, as its de-
radicalization program focuses on religious re-education, yet it is only 14.9 percent 
Muslim.321 Perhaps Singapore has pursued a de-radicalization program aimed at religious 
re-education because JI leaders have radicalized individuals in the country through 
religious indoctrination.322 Hoping to compensate for their past misdeeds and change 
their lives around, many detainees in Singapore’s de-radicalization program gravitated 
toward religious advisers who could spiritually bring them closer to Islam.323 As a result 
of their religious indoctrination by JI heads, the detainees adopted an ‘extremist 
interpretation of Islam imbibed from Afghanistan that included a strong, anti-American, 
jihadist streak.’324 It is conceivable then that Singapore devised the RRG to challenge the 
“virulent, adversarial worldview” that JI was propagating.325  
 
 
319 Ibid, 7. 
320 Ibid. 
321 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population. 
322 Kumar Ramakrishna, “The ‘Three Rings’ of Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Ideological Work in 
Singapore a Decade on,” 428. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid, 429. 
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          Figure 4. De-radicalization Approaches and Official Religion 
            Correlation=-0.174077656 
            Sources: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014,  
            El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Fox 2011, Harrigan 2013, International   
            Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 2010, Mekhennet 2011, Ramakrishna 2014,  
            Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
  
 
          Regarding the second hypothesis, Figure 4 shows that the dependent variable has a 
negative relationship with the second independent variable, official religion. Countries 
with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious 
re-education. However, the relationship between the variables is not strong, as the 
correlation value is -0.174077656.326  
          One country that fits the second hypothesis well is Malaysia, as the Malaysian 
Government uses its designation as an “Islamic state” to justify its religious re-education 
efforts targeted at JI detainees.327 Through conversations on “the concept of jihad,” for 
326 See Figure 4. De-radicalization Approaches and Official Religion. 
327 Zachary Abuza, “The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah detainees in South East Asia: A preliminary 
assessment,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (London: Routledge, 2009), 
207. 
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example, Muslim scholars aim to show detainees that “militant struggle is not the only 
means to obtain desired ends.”328  
          Alternatively, the US does not correspond as well to my second hypothesis, as it 
has no official religion, yet has pursued a de-radicalization program in Iraq that placed 
relatively equal significance on religious re-education and social incentives. The US 
implemented the Islamic Discussion Program (IDP), aiming to confront the ideology of 
“moderate” to the “most extreme detainees” by using Muslim clerics to contest detainees’ 
extreme interpretation of the Qur’an, for example.329 More moderate detainees underwent 
a shorter duration program, while the most radical, who may have provided support for or 
carried out terrorist acts, were kept in the IDP longer.330 The US may have been 
motivated to initiate the IDP in response to “radical teachings” perpetuated by Iraqi 
detainees that highlighted the “injustice of detention,” namely, the absence of “legal 
proceedings” and lack of any “hope for release.”331   
328 Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” 152. 
329 Ami Angell and Rohan Gunaratna, Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq, (Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, 2012), 230-231. The IDP was originally known as the Religious Enlightenment Program when 
it began in August 2007. Moderate detainees were taught basic Muslim principles in a 4 day IDP, while 
already radicalized detainees who had or had not pursued terrorism were kept in the IDP for 3 to 6 weeks, 
depending on their level of extremist involvement.    
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid, 53. 
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            Figure 5. De-radicalization Approaches and Restrictions on the Majority Religion 
            Correlation= -0.161627046 
            Source: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014,  
            El-Said 2012, El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Fox 2011, Harrigan 2013, International   
            Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 2010, Mekhennet 2011, Ramakrishna 2014,  
            Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
  
 
          Lastly, concerning the third hypothesis, Figure 5 illustrates that the dependent 
variable has a negative relationship with the third independent variable, restrictions on 
adherents of the majority religion that do not align with the state’s religious 
interpretation. The more restrictions a state has on adherents of the majority religion that 
do not align with the state’s religious interpretation, the less likely a country’s de-
radicalization efforts will focus on religious re-education. However, the relationship 
between the variables is not strong, as the correlation value is  
-0.161627046.332 
          One country that affirms my third hypothesis is Egypt, as its de-radicalization 
efforts have focused on religious re-education, with the country placing significant 
constraints on adherents of Islam who do not agree with the state’s religious 
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interpretation. In 2007, Egyptian security forces arrested individuals for their 
involvement in a group that interprets Islam according to the Qur’an with little regard for 
“other sources of Islamic law,” as the Egyptian Government views Shari’a as the 
country’s “primary source of legislation.”333 Additionally, Egypt has been known to 
arrest Shi’ite Muslims due to their alternative religious interpretation, and has subjected 
them to torture, as well as “administrative detention without charge or trial.”334  
          In contrast to Egypt, Yemen does not affirm the third hypothesis, as while its de-
radicalization efforts focused on religious re-education, the country demonstrated no 
constraints on adherents of Islam that do not align with the state’s religious interpretation. 
The US Department of State (2005) reported that the country’s Muslims “are free to 
worship according to their beliefs,” and Yemeni Government “military force” against 
certain Muslim sects has been “politically, not religiously, motivated.”335 Starting in 
2004, the Islamist terrorist group ‘Shabab al‑Moumineen,’ which follows a different 
strand of Shia Islam than the majority “Zaydi-Shi'as,” attempted to take over the 
Government, prompting the Yemeni military to topple the uprising.336 
          
          Comparative Case Study: Afghanistan and Denmark    
         Two countries that warrant further examination are Afghanistan and Denmark, as 
they have both pursued de-radicalization programs that focus on social re-integration. 
333 US Department of State, “Egypt, International Religious Freedom Report 2007,” 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2007/90209.htm (accessed March 2, 2015). The three individuals arrested 
in May 2007 were part of the Qurani movement. 
334 Ibid. 
335 US Department of State, “Yemen, International Religious Freedom Report 2005,” 




                                                 
Perhaps there are other explanations besides the percent of the population that is Muslim; 
official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree 
with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses that account for why these 
countries both emphasize the same approach. In Table 7, I explore alternative 
explanations to see if they can better explain why both countries have focused on social 
re-integration rather than religious re-education. 
     Table 7. Comparative Case Study 
 Afghanistan Denmark 
De-radicalization Approach 1 (social re-integration) 1 (social re-integration) 
Percent of total population that is 
Muslim (2010) 
99.8% 4.1% 
Official religion? (2008) 3 (1 official religion) 3 (1 official religion) 
Restrictions on the majority religion? 
(2008)  





constrains actions of 
adherents of majority 
religion who do not 
agree with state’s 
religious interpretation) 
1 (no restrictions) 
Other Explanations 




1 (slightly restricted for 
some minorities) 
0 (not significantly 
restricted for any) 
Restrictions on formal religious 
organizations other than political 
parties (2008) 
0 (no restrictions) 0 (no restrictions) 
Social protection (percent share in 
total GDP) (2009-2011) 
0.5% 25.2% 
Social protection (percent share in 
total public expenditures) (2009-2011) 
2.5% 43.6% 
       Sources: Angell and Gunaratna 2012, Barrett and El-Said 2013, Billing 2014, Butt and Tuck 2014, El-Said 2012,  
       El-Said 2013, El-Said and Harrigan 2013, Fox 2011, Harrigan 2013, International Centre for Political Violence and  
       Terrorism Research 2010, International Food Policy Research Institute 2015, Mekhennet 2011, Pew Research  
       Center 2011, Ramakrishna 2014, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014. 
 
          Based on Table 7, social welfare may help to explain why Denmark has 
highlighted social re-integration in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists.337 The country’s 
337 I do not mention Islamist terrorists here as Denmark has been known more to de-radicalize Islamist 
extremists who may not yet have pursued violence. 
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social protection as percent share in total expenditures is especially telling, as it accounts 
for nearly 44 percent of its total public expenditures.338 In welfare states such as 
Denmark, membership in society is ultimately characterized by joining civil society 
organizations and being employed.339 Denmark’s scheme fits this description well, as due 
to the country’s de-radicalization efforts, several foreign fighters who have returned from 
Syria “are now back in school and have a job.”340 Also, the country’s de-radicalization 
efforts involve civil society, as “youth club leaders” can refer individuals to the country’s 
program in Aarhus, if they exhibit certain extremist sympathies.341  
          Regarding Afghanistan, the measures listed in Table 7 are not as telling, as, for 
example, despite the fact that the country’s de-radicalization efforts emphasize social re-
integration, its social spending as percent share of total public expenditures is low, at 2.5 
percent.342 Afghan authorities have suggested that as many of the individuals being 
detained “joined the Taliban because they had no jobs,” rather than being influenced by a 
“radical ideology,” detainees “will benefit more from learning to use a sewing machine” 
over “religious counselling.”343 Therefore, as extremist ideology was not the main 
motivator for terrorism in Afghanistan’s case, the country’s de-radicalization efforts have 
338 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study. 
339 Marco Goli and Shahamak Rezaei, “Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An 
Empirical Inquiry,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (Winter 2011): 107. 
340 Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert, and Nick Thompson, CNN, “Denmark offers some foreign fighters rehab 
without jail time—but will it work?” (published October 28, 2014). 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/europe/denmark-syria-deradicalization-program/ (accessed March 
4, 2015). 
341 Soren Billing, USANews.com, “Denmark’s jihadist rehab: homework, football and Islam,” (published 
December 3, 2014) http://usa.news.net/article/2395181/denmarks-jihadist-rehab-homework-football-and-
islam (accessed March 5, 2015).  
342 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study. 
343 Susan Sim, “Strategies for Successful Risk Reduction Programmes for Violent Extremists: Lessons from 
Singapore, Indonesia and Afghanistan,” 68. 
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focused more on re-integrating detainees through employment creation and vocational 
training rather than on moderating any extremist viewpoints.  
           
          Conclusion 
          Although scholars have recently examined the percent of the population that is 
Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do 
not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses vis-à-vis de-
radicalization, these variables may not be helpful in determining whether states pursue 
de-radicalization programs that either emphasize religious re-education or social re-
integration. Perhaps other factors, such as social spending, may explain why a country 
might concentrate on social re-integration as opposed to religious re-education as part of 
its de-radicalization efforts. As my findings suggest, Denmark may concentrate on social 
re-integration in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists because it is a welfare state, which 
emphasizes job creation and involvement in civic life as part of its core values.    
          By examining the different approaches that countries emphasize in their de-
radicalization programs, policymakers can attempt to determine what mix of approaches 
they may wish to pursue within their own country contexts. Although the independent 
variables that I selected for my study are not significantly related to de-radicalization 
approaches, perhaps other factors, such as public spending on social services, may be. If 
in the future I find that states with higher social spending as a percentage of total 
expenditures are more likely to emphasize social re-integration in their de-radicalization 
programs, then other social welfare states may be more inclined to incorporate vocational 
training, mentorship, and other social aspects into their own de-radicalization schemes.               
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           In future research, I could examine whether there may be a significant relationship 
between the independent variables and de-radicalization approaches that countries 
emphasize by making the dependent variable more nuanced. For example, I could devise 
a question scheme to account for whether the literature describes a country’s de-
radicalization program as emphasizing a religious re-education approach, but describes 
religious rehabilitation as being compulsory versus voluntary. This way, I may be able to 
observe whether mandatory participation in a religious re-education scheme is more 
closely correlated to restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree 
with the state’s religious interpretation than voluntary participation may be. 
          Also, it may be worthwhile in the future to study whether the different ways that 
Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists became radicalized or involved in terrorism 
affect what approaches countries choose to focus their de-radicalization efforts on. For 
instance, if a majority of Islamist extremists or terrorists may have been radicalized 
through madrassas, then a country may choose to emphasize religious re-education more 
in its de-radicalization approach. Likewise, if a great number of Islamist terrorists in a 
country turned to terrorism because they did not have any other job prospects, then a 
country may choose to emphasize social re-integration, with a focus on creating jobs.   
          To review, the first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s 
de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, 
revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country’s level of state 
repression increases, the success ranking of each de-radicalization program increases, 
although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater 
the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has the more a country’s de-
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radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are 
less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries 
with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the 
state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, 
all 3 relationships are not strong.  
          As Chapter 1 finds, more successful de-radicalization programs do not necessarily 
result in less Islamist terrorism. The number of terrorist attacks in a country may be 
affected by other variables besides de-radicalization, including the number of security 
personnel, the availability of effective surveillance equipment, and state repression. Also, 
allegedly successful de-radicalization programs may not lead to less Islamist terrorism in 
countries such as Algeria, as this country has experienced an inordinate number of 
terrorist attacks compared to other states. Similarly, while factors including high 
socioeconomic development and participation by qualified religious authorities may 
favor successful de-radicalization according to the literature, such proxy variables may 
actually not be indicative of less Islamist terrorist attacks. 
          Other influences, including IO membership, may decrease Islamist terrorism, as 
collaboration with regional and international partners to share information and 
communicate best practices on this type of activity can enable governments to more 
effectively reduce the number of Islamist terrorist attacks. For Chapter 2, other variables 
beside state repression, including selective inducements, may make de-radicalization 
more successful, as compliance with conditions such as prisoner releases can compel 
Islamist terrorists and Islamist extremists to reform their ideology and relinquish 
terrorism. Lastly, for Chapter 3, factors such as social spending may better explain a 
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country’s de-radicalization approach than religious characteristics, as states with higher 
expenditures on social programs may emphasize a de-radicalization approach that is 
oriented toward social re-integration. 
          Whether de-radicalization programs compel Islamist terrorists to abandon terrorism 
or convince Islamist extremists or terrorists to moderate their radical views, de-
radicalization has ultimately succeeded if formerly radical or violent individuals are re-
integrated into society. Although some countries’ de-radicalization schemes focus more 
on religious re-education rather than social re-integration, the fundamental goal of 
governments is to bring those individuals who may have deviated from a moderate, non-
violent path back into the mainstream.  
          As de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists 
are still a novelty, many of them having been established after 9/11, scholars must 
undertake further research to explore what makes some programs more successful than 
others, as well as what makes each country’s de-radicalization efforts unique.  
          Perhaps now more than ever, it is high time for governments to consider de-
radicalization in the context of Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism, as ISIS 
radicalizes and recruits fighters through its toxic message on a daily basis. Regrettably, as 
Al Qaeda and ISIS-influenced individuals and groups have recently committed terrorist 
attacks in countries as diverse as Canada, Tunisia, Australia, and France, governments 
must come to grips with re-incorporating violent Islamist extremists and Islamist 




          Also, for those individuals who may have adopted Islamist extremist views but 
may not have yet acted on them, countries must consider de-radicalization to bring such 
individuals back into the mainstream before they take violent action. Truly, there is no 
more critical time for countries to pursue de-radicalization programs to bring Islamist 
extremists and Islamist terrorists back into the fold. If we fail to do so, then we allow the 
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      Appendix B. Islamist Terrorist Groups 
Abdullah Azzam Brigades 
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) 
Algerian Islamic Extremists 
Algerian Moslem Fundamentalists 
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) 
Al-Haramayn Brigades 
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq 
Al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia 
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Al-Qa’ida in Yemen 
Al-Qa’ida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division 
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
Believing Youth Organization 
Huthis 
Islamist Extremists 
Jadid Al-Qa`idah Bangladesh (JAQB) 
Jaish al-Mukhtar 
      Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh) 
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 
Jihad Islamic League Front 
Muslim Extremists 
Muslim Militants 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) 
Squadrons of Terror (Katibat El Ahoual) 
Sympathizers of Al-Qa’ida Organization 
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